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ABSTRACT

Chief Justice Taney’s 1857 opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford is justly infamous for its holdings that African
Americans could never be citizens, that Congress was powerless to prohibit slavery in the territories, and for its
proclamation that persons of African ancestry “had no rights which the white man was bound to respect.” For
all of the interest in and attention to Dred Scott, however, no scholar has previously analyzed United States
v. Dow, an 1840 decision of Chief Justice Taney in a circuit court trial which is apparently the first federal
decision to articulate a broad theoretical basis for white supremacy. Dow identified whites as the “master” race,
and the opinion explained that only those of European origin were either welcomed or allowed to be members of
the political community in the American colonies. Non-whites such as members of Dow’s race, Taney explained,
could be reduced to slavery, and therefore their rights continued to be subject to absolute legislative discretion. Dow,
however, was not a person of African descent—he was Malay, from the Philippines. Chief Justice Taney’s
employment in Dow of legal reasoning which he would later apply in Dred Scott suggests that Dred Scott
should be regarded as pertinent to all people of color, not only African Americans. This understanding of Dred
Scott helps explain the revival of Taney’s reputation during the Jim Crow era after Reconstruction. Courts
declined to invalidate restrictions with respect to a broad range of civil rights on citizens and immigrants of African,
Indian, Asian, and Mexican ancestry to which whites were not subject. Indeed, whites could not be subject to
them, unless it is conceivable that under the U.S. Constitution, the law could provide, for example, that all races
would be ineligible to testify or vote because of their race. Accordingly, even after Reconstruction—just as Dred
Scott and Dow contemplated—the white race remained the master race, in the sense that members of that race
were the exclusive holders of truly inalienable rights.
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INTRODUCTION
“Perhaps no legal case in American history is as famous—or as
infamous—as Dred Scott v. Sandford.”1 Cass Sunstein called Dred Scott2
“probably the most important case in the history of the Supreme Court of
the United States. Indeed, it was probably the most important constitutional
case in the history of any nation and any court.”3 U.S. Supreme Court Chief
Justice Roger Brooke Taney became notorious for his holdings that Congress
had no power to prevent the spread of legal slavery in United States
territories, and that no person of African descent could be a citizen, based on
a conclusion that at the founding of the country, they were
regarded as beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with
the white race, either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that
they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect; and that the
negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit.4

After more than 150 years, the decision still draws intense academic
attention.5 Some historians have suggested that Dred Scott was a cause of the
1
2
3
4
5

Paul Finkelman, The Dred Scott Case, Slavery and the Politics of Law, 20 HAMLINE L. REV. 1, 1 (1996).
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
Cass R. Sunstein, The Dred Scott Case, 1 GREEN BAG 2d 39, 39 (1997).
60 U.S. at 407.
See, e.g., Lea VanderVelde & Sandhya Subramanian, Mrs. Dred Scott, 106 YALE L.J. 1033, 1033
(1997) (“Dred Scott v. Sandford stands in infamy in American constitutional law and the history of the
Supreme Court.”). There is of course a voluminous literature on the case. See DON E.
FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS
(1978); PAUL FINKELMAN, DRED SCOTT V. SANDFORD: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS
(2d ed. 2016); Jennifer M. Chacón, Citizenship and Family: Revisiting Dred Scott, 27 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y 45 (2008); Daniel A. Farber, A Fatal Loss of Balance: Dred Scott Revisited, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 13
(2011); Paul Finkelman, Was Dred Scott Correctly Decided? An “Expert Report” for the Defendant, 12
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1219, 1221 (2008); Paul Finkelman, Coming to Terms with Dred Scott: A
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Civil War.6
This article proposes that a landmark opinion shedding light on the
meaning of Dred Scott has been overlooked and remained unanalyzed until
now. Dred Scott—or at least the reasoning of Dred Scott—was not solely about
the status of enslaved African Americans. United States v. Dow7 is an 1840
decision by Chief Justice Taney, written as he presided over a trial in the
U.S. Circuit Court. Dow, touched on by courts and scholars only rarely and
in passing,8 analyzed the same historical and legal issues that Taney would
confront in Dred Scott seventeen years later: Which race was “master,” and
which others were sufficiently “inferior” that they might be enslaved; which
race was worthy of participation in the political community, and which
people among the world’s nations were “civilized.” In Dow, Taney held that
the defendant was not a “Christian white person,” and thus was not entitled
to the protections afforded that class under the law of evidence. Accordingly,
for a crime for which a white person could not have been charged for lack of

6

7
8

Response to Daniel A. Farber, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 49 (2011); Mark A. Graber, Dred Scott as a Centrist
Decision, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1229, 1230 (2005); Mark A. Graber, Desperately Ducking Slavery: Dred Scott
and Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 271 (1997); Scott W. Howe, Atoning for
Dred Scott and Plessy While Substantially Abolishing the Death Penalty, 95 WASH. L. REV. 737 (2020);
Louise Weinberg, Dred Scott and the Crisis of 1860, 82 CHI.–KENT L. REV. 97 (2007).
See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 5, at 457 (“Clearly, the [Dred Scott] decision by itself did not have a
convulsive effect on sectional politics, but it became one of the elements in an explosive
compound.”); Paul Finkelman, Scott v. Sandford: The Court’s Most Dreadful Case and How It Changed
History, 82 CHI.–KENT L. REV. 3, 3 (2007) (“Though surely an exaggeration, it has been said that
the case caused the Civil War. While other forces caused secession and the War, Dred Scott surely
played a role in the timing of both.”); Henry A. Forster, Did the Decision in the Dred Scott Case Lead
to the Civil War?, 52 AM. L. REV. 875 (1918); Louise Weinberg, Dred Scott and the Crisis of 1860, 82
CHI.–KENT L. REV. 97, 98 (2007) (“[I]n the crisis of 1860 Dred Scott had in fact become the lynchpin
of Southern policy and the focus of Northern protests.”).
United States v. Dow, 25 F. Cas. 901 (C.C.D. Md. 1840) (No. 14,990).
Dow has been cited in the legal literature only a handful of times, usually in a footnote. See Alfred
Avins, The Right to Be a Witness and the Fourteenth Amendment, 31 MO. L. REV. 471, 476 n.50 (1966);
Andrew T. Fede, Not the Most Insignificant Justice: Reconsidering Justice Gabriel Duvall’s Slavery Law
Opinions Favoring Liberty, 42 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 7, 21 & 26 n.77 (2017); Stephen A. Siegel, The Federal
Government’s Power to Enact Color-Conscious Laws: An Originalist Inquiry, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 477, 515
n.238 (1998); Pamela J. Smith, Our Children’s Burden: The Many-Headed Hydra of the Educational
Disenfranchisement of Black Children, 42 HOW. L.J. 133, 153 n.70 (1999); Book Notices, 5 W. JURIST 477,
478 (1871) (reviewing edition of Taney’s “many valuable and important decisions” including
“United States v. Dow, on the competency of the testimony of negroes, and the status of the Malay
race” and noting that “[w]hen we shall, as a nation, recover our own equilibrium, and learn to
make necessary and just allowances for the bias of education and surroundings, we will place Roger
Brooke Taney in the front line of jurists of the nineteenth century, either English or American.”).
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evidence,9 Dow was condemned to death (though ultimately pardoned).10 In
its holding that Dow’s freedom was a question of state law, the opinion
accurately mapped the future: Even with respect to citizens of color, the
rights of non-whites were subject to the political will of the dominant race.
However, Dow was not African. He was “Malay,” from the Philippines.
In a certain sense, Dred Scott’s continued prominence requires
explanation. Decided in 1857, some of its holdings were not merely rendered
moot but definitively rejected and reversed no later than 1868 with the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.11 Because the Thirteenth
Amendment wholly abolished slavery, the Constitution also unquestionably
prohibited slavery in the territories.12 Dred Scott was deeply racist, but there
are many such texts from equally prominent leaders.
Reading Dow and Dred Scott together illuminates the meaning of the latter
and helps explain its continuing relevance. Dow and Dred Scott were the first
federal cases articulating a political theory of race and racial status in the
United States.13 The Constitution, of course, functioned to protect slavery,
but it did not use the words “slavery,” “African,” or “Negro,” some have
argued, in an effort to minimize the appearance of constitutional approval or
involvement.14 No federal cases had articulated a comprehensive theory of
9

10
11
12

13

14

See, e.g., United States v. Beddo, 24 F. Cas. 1061, 1062 (C.C.D.D.C. 1835) (No. 14,556) (“[T]he
United States, finding that there were no witnesses for the prosecution other than free negroes and
mulattoes born of colored women, ordered a nolle prosequi to be entered with the leave of the
court.”).
25 F. Cas. at 905. He received a full pardon on August 7, 1844, less than five years after the killing.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.”).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment
for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or
any place subject to their jurisdiction.”).
There is another antecedent, Attorney General Taney’s 1832 opinion, official but unpublished,
evaluating the lawfulness of a South Carolina statute excluding sailors of color from South Carolina
ports. In upholding the provision, Taney explored the citizenship and political position of persons
of African ancestry in the United States in ways reminiscent of his later work. H. Jefferson Powell,
Attorney General Taney & the South Carolina Police Bill, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 75 (2001).
Compare Paul Finkelman, Affirmative Action for the Master Class: The Creation of the Proslavery Constitution,
32 AKRON L. REV. 423, 424 (1999) (“The Constitution of 1787 was a proslavery document,
designed to prevent any national assault on slavery, while at the same time structured to protect the
interests of slaveowners at the expense of African Americans and their antislavery white allies.”);
J.M. Balkin, Agreements with Hell and Other Objects of Our Faith, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1703, 1707
(1997) (“One of the great debates of the first half of the nineteenth century was the extent to which
the Constitution protected the institution of slavery. Although the Constitution made oblique
references to slavery at several places, the protection of slavery was very much built into its
structure.”); with James Boyd White, Constructing A Constitution: “Original Intention” in the Slave Cases, 47
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racial hierarchy.15 Dow and Dred Scott together outlined the rights of all races,
at least as contemplated at the time. In that sense, Dred Scott was not about
slavery alone, as critical as that issue was. It also addressed free people of
color, including but not limited to persons of African ancestry, and
recognized state authority to determine their status and rights—even if they
were, in a technical legal sense, citizens. To this extent, Dred Scott remains
important because it outlined a constitutional and historical theory of white
supremacy that was influential for a century after Reconstruction, and the
case has not yet been fully resolved. Indeed, Dred Scott continues to resonate
for some; on white supremacist websites like Stormfront.org, it remains the
law of the land in the hopes and imaginations of many.16
In addition to political theory, Dow and Dred Scott also outlined legal
doctrine which could bring into operation the racial hierarchy they
envisioned. Part of that doctrine was that legal principles flowing from slave
law could, in the discretion of the states, apply to free people of color just as
they did to enslaved persons.
Finally, Dow makes clear that anti-Chinese movement in the Pacific Coast
jurisdictions starting in the 1860s was not the beginning of inclusion of Asians

15

16

MD. L. REV. 239, 268 (1987) (“[T]he absence in the Constitution of any talk about race, and the
oblique references to slavery, could be read very differently from the way Taney suggests: not as
pointing to views so deeply and obviously held that they need not be expressed, but as a deliberate
attempt to escape from those views. The enormous gap between the race-free language of the
Constitution and the kinds of social facts to which Taney points would then have a shouting
significance. Of course, Blacks, slave or free, were systematically degraded, and in ways we could
not or would not change overnight; but this fact was inconsistent with our ideals for ourselves, and
in writing the Constitution as we did we chose not to perpetuate or confirm those aspects of our
lives, but to disapprove them.”); Robert J. Kaczorowski, The Supreme Court and Congress’s Power to
Enforce Constitutional Rights: An Overlooked Moral Anomaly, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 153, 162 n.29 (2004)
(noting Justice Chase’s view that “[t]he framers of the Constitution sought to prevent the federal
government from having anything to do with slavery, and they carefully avoided conferring any
constitutional powers on the federal government to support slavery. A state could either establish
slavery or not, as it saw fit. As slavery was wholly a matter of state law, the federal government
possessed no constitutional power to abolish slavery in the states in which it existed; but neither
could the federal government enforce slavery in the states that refused to recognize it.”).
The Federalist Papers touched on some issues regarding slavery but did not make a comprehensive
case for or against White supremacy. See James Oakes, “The Compromising Expedient”: Justifying A
Proslavery Constitution, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 2023, 2048 (1996) (“A concordance to The Federalist
Papers lists twenty references to the words slave, slavery, and slaves. James Madison wrote nineteen
of them. His most extended discussion appeared in Federalist No. 54. He also made a brief case
for the slave trade clause in Federalist No. 42 and an even briefer reference in No. 38.”).
For example, poster “WhiteRights,” who joined the forum in June 2004 and posted over 100,000
times, explained that President Obama was not a legitimate President because “[a]ccording to the
Dred Scott decision, African Americans were ‘not and could never be citizens of the United States’
let alone president.” STORMFRONT (June 22, 2019, 4:43 PM), https://www.stormfront
.org/forum/t1282565-22/?postcount=219 - post14885547 [https:// perma.cc/LDD4-KUWV].
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in U.S. race law. Supreme Court cases like Fong Yue Ting v. United States,17 in
1893—upholding race-based deportation—and Lum v. Rice,18 in 1927—
approving Mississippi’s assignment of a Chinese student to a segregated
school, along with all other members of the “brown, yellow, and black
races”19—were not post-Reconstruction innovations, belatedly finding a
place for Asians in a nation where the law had been employed to make whites
supreme over Blacks.20 Instead, Chief Justice Taney’s ready application to
Asians in 1840 of law regulating free people of color suggests that from the
very beginning of this country, white supremacy was a complete,
comprehensive, and operational jurisprudence—at least to those like Taney,
who made and applied the law.
Dow and Dred Scott make clear that there was, and had to be, a master
race. To be sure, there was controversy over the words of the Declaration of
Independence that “all men are created equal, and endowed by their Creator
with the inalienable right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”21
Perhaps this phrase sowed the seeds of liberty for all that might develop in
the fullness of time, as abolitionists including Frederick Douglass and
Lysander Spooner argued;22 perhaps instead it enshrined white supremacy.
But interpreted broadly or narrowly, if the United States was a republic that
had thrown off monarchy, racial subordination of whites became a logical
impossibility, because some group had to be the holder of inalienable rights.
As will be shown, under United States law, non-whites could be, for
example, denied the right to vote, own property, or testify against whites.
But only in a dictatorship or monarchy could people of color and whites—
that is, everyone—be denied the right to vote, own property, and testify.
People of color might be deported from the United States on the basis of
race, but only if the nation were to be emptied out entirely could the law seek
to deport or expatriate everyone on the basis of race. Unless everyone was

17
18
19
20

21
22

Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, 82 (1927).
Id.
For example, the great historian Oscar Handlin wrote: “By the end of the [nineteenth] century the
pattern of racist practices and ideas seemed fully developed: the Orientals were to be totally
excluded; the Negroes were to live in a segregated enclave; the Indians were to be confined to
reservations as permanent wards of the nation . . . .” OSCAR HANDLIN, RACE AND NATIONALITY
IN AMERICAN LIFE 48 (1957). His point was insightful and correct as far as it went. But the legal
foundation had been laid before.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
See Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the
De Facto Era, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1353 (2006) (describing how Frederick Douglass and Lysander
Spooner viewed the Constitution as anti-slavery).
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to be potentially a slave and no one secure in the inalienable rights of
citizenship, choices had to be made: (1) race-based classifications had to be
prohibited, (2) slavery had to be prohibited and citizenship made universal,
or (3) there had to be a race exempt from enslavement and denial of some
basic rights of citizenship. Dred Scott and Dow explained that U.S. law elected
the third possibility.
Dred Scott remained vital after Reconstruction because its main point was
not the denial of citizenship, as cruel and wrong as that decision was. Being
native-born, rather than an “alien,” Dred Scott probably was a national of
the United States in the international law sense of the term.23 Even had he
been deemed a citizen, that classification would have availed him nothing
except the opportunity to sue for freedom in a federal court and lose.
Citizenship hardly impeded many forms of segregation. Even the right of
U.S. citizens not to be deported was valuable only to a point, given the power
of Congress to expatriate and the practice of extralegal deportation. As Dred
Scott and Dow held, the states were allowed to arrange their internal affairs,
including the status of residents, largely as they pleased. Neither the states
nor the federal government was burdened by a meaningful prohibition on
racial discrimination until the Civil Rights Revolution of the 1960s.
Part I discusses United States v. Dow in relation to Dred Scott. Together, they
identified civilized Christian nations populated by members of the white race
who sent their people to what became the United States and formed the
political community there. As a white Christian nation, people of other races
or religions were not encouraged to immigrate to the United States, and if
they did were not allowed to participate in government. Africans, Indians,
and Malays, and other races which could be enslaved by law, were not part
of the People of the United States.
Part II discusses application of the theory of Dred Scott to free people of
color. Courts, scholars, and the press, including the African American press,
did not consider Dred Scott to have been effectively repudiated by the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. At least after the end of
Reconstruction, these observers frequently claimed that free people of color
had no rights that the white man was bound to respect. They had a point.
Even when possessed of legal citizenship, people of color could be
23

For international law purposes, one who owes allegiance or is subject to protection by another
country is a “national” of that country. See, e.g., Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 587 (1953) (“A
state ‘is not debarred by any rule of international law from governing the conduct of its own citizens
upon the high seas or even in foreign countries when the rights of other nations or their nationals
are not infringed.’”) (citation omitted).
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disenfranchised, denied the right to own property, denied the right to testify,
segregated in various contexts, and arbitrarily deprived of their liberty. On
the other hand, given the self-conception of the United States as a free
republic, it is not conceivable that whites could have been deprived of liberty
or property because of their race, as people of color were—so that, in effect,
no one could, vote, testify, or own property. The legal regime Dow and Dred
Scott had mapped was in place until the Second Reconstruction of the 1960s.
I.

DOW AND DRED SCOTT

In 1840, seventeen years before he decided Dred Scott, Chief Justice Roger
Brooke Taney as Circuit Justice faced another case in which he had to
determine the legal relationship between the races.24 Sailor Lorenzo Dow
was accused of murder on the high seas of William Langdon, captain of the
Frances,25 a U.S.-flag vessel, and tried in the U.S. Court for the District of
Maryland, the Chief Justice presiding as trial judge.
At the time of the murder, the captain was the only white person on board;
the crew consisted of the Malay, three negroes, and one mulatto; two of the
negroes were natives of Philadelphia, and one a native of the state of
Delaware; the mulatto was a native of the British province of Nova Scotia;
they were all free.26

Under the law at the time, federal judges applied state rules of evidence
at trial.27 Taney understood Maryland law to provide that “negroes and
mulattoes, free or slave, are not competent witnesses, in any case wherein a
Christian white person is concerned; but they are competent witnesses
against all other persons.”28 The witnesses against Dow were free persons of
African ancestry. The evidence showed that Dow
was a native of the town of Manilla, in one of the Philippine Islands; that his
parents were both Malays, living in that town, and subjects of the queen of
Spain; that they were Christians, and that the prisoner was baptized and
24
25
26
27

28

United States v. Dow, 25 F. Cas. 901, 902 (C.C.D. Md. 1840) (No. 14,990).
Murder on the High Seas, BURLINGTON FREE PRESS (Vt.), Feb. 21, 1840, at 4; Sentence of Death,
MORNING HERALD (N.Y.C.), May 21, 1840, at 1.
Dow, 25 F. Cas. at 902.
Vance v. Campbell, 66 U.S. 427, 430 (1861) (“The thirty-fourth section of the judiciary act provides
that the laws of the several States, with the exceptions there stated, shall be regarded as rules of
decision in trials at common law in the courts of the United States. This section has been construed
to include the rules of evidence prescribed by the laws of the State in all civil cases at common law
not within the exceptions therein mentioned.”); United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. 361, 366 (1851) (“the
rules of evidence in criminal cases, are the rules which were in force in the respective states when
the Judiciary Act of 1789 was passed”), overruled in part by Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467
(1918).
Dow, 25 F. Cas. at 902.
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educated in the Christian religion, and had always professed to be a
Christian.29

Dow claimed the exemption of the evidence rule, insisting that persons
of African ancestry could not testify against him. Taney understood that in
ruling on the objection “[t]he only question is, whether he is to be regarded
as a Christian white person? 30
In an opinion as prolix and convoluted as Dred Scott would later be, Taney
explained why he answered the question in the negative. He had three
reasons.
First, anticipating the scientific racism embraced by later Supreme Court
jurisprudence,31 the Chief Justice noted that “the Malays have never been
ranked by any writer among the white races.”32
Second, Taney explained that Dow was not white because when
Maryland was founded, Dow would not have been desired as a member of
the political community, nor have been invited to participate in it. The basis
for the doctrine of testimonial exclusion was not “the differences, moral or
physical, which have been supposed to exist between the different races of
mankind; the law was made for practical purposes, and grew out of the
political and social condition of the colony.” In particular, only white
Christian men were granted political power, and only they were invited to
immigrate:
The colonists were all of the white race, and all professed the Christian
religion; from the situation of the world at that time, no persons but white
men professing the Christian religion could be expected to emigrate to
Maryland; and if any person of a different color, or professing a different
religion, had come into the colony, he would not, at that time, have been
recognized as an equal by the colonists, or deemed worthy of participating
with them in the privileges of this community. The only nations of the world
which were then regarded, or perhaps entitled to be regarded, as civilized,

29
30
31

32

Id.
Id. at 903.
See, e.g., Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 198 (1922) (“The appellant, in the case now under
consideration, however, is clearly of a race which is not Caucasian and therefore belongs entirely
outside the zone on the negative side. A large number of the federal and state courts have so
decided and we find no reported case definitely to the contrary. These decisions are sustained by
numerous scientific authorities, which we do not deem it necessary to review. We think these
decisions are right and so hold.”). For further discussion of the pseudo-scientific racial ideology in
the United States, see IBRAM X. KENDI, STAMPED FROM THE BEGINNING: THE DEFINITIVE
HISTORY OF RACIST IDEAS IN AMERICA (2016); YELLOW PERIL!: AN ARCHIVE OF ANTI-ASIAN
FEAR, ch. 3 (John Kuo Wei Tchen & Dylan Yeats eds., 2014).
Dow, 25 F. Cas. at 903. See also id. (“But it is admitted, that he is a Malay; and the Malays are not
white men, and have never been classed with the white race.”).
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were the white Christian nations of Europe; and certainly emigrants were
not expected or desired from any other quarter.33

A third and final consideration was that some races were susceptible to
enslavement by the white race. Taney explained that the origin of
testimonial disqualification of enslavable races was the potential risk to
whites:
Christian white men could not be reduced to slavery, or held as slaves in the
colony; but they might, according to the laws of the colony, lawfully hold in
slavery negroes or mulattoes, or Indians. The white race did not admit
individuals of either of the other races to political or social equality; they
were regarded and treated as inferiors, of whom it was lawful, under certain
circumstances, to make slaves. These three races existing in the same
territory, one possessing all the power, and holding the other two in a state
of subjection and degredation, it was natural, that feelings should be created
by such a state of things, that would make it dangerous for the white
population to receive as witnesses against themselves the members of the two
races which it had thus degraded.34

How was enslavability relevant, and how did a person of Malay ancestry
fit into this structure? The Chief Justice found that enslavability supported
treatment of a Filipino as non-White: “In Maryland, they were certainly
regarded as belonging to one of those races of whom it was lawful to make
slaves, and who, according to the laws of England and of the colony, were
legitimate objects of the slave trade.”35 Taney derived this conclusion from
his own historical research into a terse Maryland decision rejecting a freedom
suit. The entire reported decision in Mary v. Vestry of Williams & Mary’s Parish
consists of the following: “Madagascar being a country where the slave trade
is practised, and this being a country where slavery is tolerated, it is
incumbent on the petitioner to show her ancestor was free in her own country
to entitle her to freedom. The petition was dismissed.”36 Taney expanded
on the meaning of the case:
This case is not fully stated in the report; I have examined the original
papers. It was proved that the mother of the petitioner was a yellow woman
with straight black hair, and that she was not of the negro race, and the
testimony shows that it was upon this fact that the petitioner chiefly relied;
she was undoubtedly a Malay, according to the description in the evidence.
The court said that as Madagascar was a country where the slave trade is
practised, the petitioner must show that her ancestor was free in her own
country, in order to entitle her to freedom here. Now, it is well known that
33
34
35
36

Id. (“The political community of the colony was composed entirely of white men professing the
Christian religion; they possessed all the powers of government granted by the charter.”).
Id.
Id.
Mary v. Vestry of Williams & Mary’s Par., 3 H. & McH. 501, 502, 1796 WL 636 (Md. Gen. 1796).
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the Malay race form a part of the population of Madagascar; and
consequently, under this decision, may be held in slavery in this state, if they
were slaves in their own country, and when imported here as slaves, they are
presumed to have been slaves in their own country, till the contrary
appears.37

Taney concluded that because “Malays might lawfully be held in slavery
in the colony of Maryland, and consequently, are not embraced by the
description of white men as mentioned in the act of 1717, and the testimony
offered is not excluded by that law.”38 China and other Asian nations then
had lawful chattel slavery and the slave trade.39
Importantly, the Chief Justice’s reasoning did not classify as enslavable,
and hence non-white, only individuals who were actually enslaved. Indeed,
during the Antebellum period, not only were some people of African ancestry
not enslaved—free African Americans could sometimes themselves own
human property.40 Nevertheless, Maryland, in common with other slave
states,41 disqualified even free members of an enslavable race from testifying

37
38
39

40

41

Dow, 25 F. Cas. at 903–04 (citations omitted).
Id. at 904.
Angela Schottenhammer, Slaves and Forms of Slavery in Late Imperial China (Seventeenth to Early Twentieth
Centuries), 24 SLAVERY & ABOLITION 143 (2003); PAMELA KYLE CROSSLEY, Slavery in Early Modern
China, in 3 CAMBRIDGE WORLD HIST. OF SLAVERY: AD 1420–AD 1804, 186 (David Eltis &
Stanley L. Engerman eds., 2011); Anderson v. Poindexter, 6 Ohio St. 623, 675 (1856) (Brinkerhoff,
J., concurring) (“If it were so, then a Greek or Asiatic, held in slavery in Turkey, would, on his
arrival in Europe or Ohio, be deemed a slave, and there subject to be treated as mere property;
and this, too, in contravention of the laws of England and Ohio.”). Of course, which races were
enslavable was a matter of state law. Phillis v. Lewis, 1 Del. Cas. 417, 418 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1796)
(“There is no law which recognizes slaves of any other description, nor any custom which has
allowed others to be held in slavery. The law would warrant us to say that a Negro or mulatto
might be a slave, but we know of no authority which would justify us in expressing the same opinion
as to any other description of people.”).
Paul Finkelman, Not Only the Judges’ Robes Were Black: African-American Lawyers As Social Engineers, 47
STAN. L. REV. 161, 171–72 n.73 (1994) (citing inter alia CARTER G. WOODSON, FREE NEGRO
OWNERS OF SLAVES IN THE UNITED STATES IN 1830, at v (1924) (pointing out that “a considerable
number of Negroes were slave owners themselves, and in some cases controlled large plantations).
However, “[t]he majority of Negro owners of slaves had some personal interest in their property.
Frequently the husband purchased his wife or vice versa; or the slaves were the children of a free
father who had purchased his wife; or they were other relatives or friends who had been rescued
from the worst features of the institution by some affluent free Negro. There were instances . . . in
which free Negroes had a real economic interest in the institution of slavery and held slaves in order
to improve their own economic status.” A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Greer C. Bosworth, “Rather
Than the Free”: Free Blacks in Colonial and Antebellum Virginia, 26 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 17, 35–36
n.91 (1991) (quoting JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & ALFRED A. MOSS JR., FROM SLAVERY TO
FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF NEGRO AMERICANS 144 (6th ed. 1988)).
Paul Finkelman, Prelude to the Fourteenth Amendment: Black Legal Rights in the Antebellum North, 17
RUTGERS L.J. 415, 451 (1986) (“The most important due process right—to testify in court without
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against whites. Dow himself was free, not enslaved, and from Manila, not
Madagascar. But those facts were irrelevant: Taney found enslavement of
completely unrelated strangers of his race, at some other time and place, was
a dispositive factor in measuring Dow’s status in the United States.
Note that because there was enslavement of particular races—not, say, of
individuals due to misconduct—it became a logical impossibility to enslave a
white person because of race. “White slavery” in U.S. law was “a revolting
crime”42 rather than a possibly legitimate labor arrangement in a system
where degradation of one meant potential degradation of all. Whites were,
Taney explained in Dow, in what is apparently the first use of the term in any
federal or state decision, “the race of which the masters were composed,”43
that is, the master race.44 Taney admitted evidence of non-white witnesses,
and Dow was convicted.45 After a new trial granted based on a defect in the
indictment, Dow was convicted again, sentenced to death, but pardoned.46
Dred Scott raised important issues about the power of Congress to prohibit
slavery in the territories which were not at issue in the Dow case. But Dred
Scott, like Dow, also mapped a vision of racial status in the political
community. Dred Scott was a freedom suit, brought in federal court after a

42
43
44

45
46

racial restrictions—was available to blacks in all but four northern states by 1860. This contrasts
with the South where only in Louisiana did free blacks have an unfettered right to testify against
whites.”).
Rogers v. Desportes, 268 F. 308, 317 (4th Cir. 1920).
Dow, 25 F. Cas. at 903.
John Howard, soon to become a Confederate lawyer, later argued before Chief Justice Taney using
the term, contending that slaves could “are punishable by the statute law, yet in a mode, and to an
extent, that recognizes no rights of any character in themselves, but, on the contrary, demonstrates
the absolute legal dominion and supremacy of the master race, and the absolute subjection of the
slave.” Argument of Counsel in United States v. Amy, 24 F. Cas. 792, 794 (C.C.D. Va. 1859) (No.
14,445) (Taney, Cir. J.). The term was later used in connection with slavery. GEORGE M.
FREDRICKSON, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND: THE DEBATE ON AFRO-AMERICAN
CHARACTER AND DESTINY, 1817–1914 61 (1971) (quoting the speech of William Yancey) (“Your
fathers and my fathers built this government on two ideas: the first is that the white race is the
citizen, and the master race, and the white man is the equal of every other white man. The second
idea is that the Negro is the inferior race.”); Louis Lusky, Minority Rights and the Public Interest, 52
YALE L.J. 1, 23 n.62 (1942) (“The vastness of the gulf between slave status and minority status
should nevertheless not be overlooked. At this distance it is not easy to envisage the full extent of
the human subjugation which this country has known. But the words of Chief Justice Taney,
writing for the Court in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393, 404–405, 407–408 (U. S. 1857), warn
against the easy assumption that the idea of a master race is wholly alien to American tradition.”).
Dow, 25 F. Cas. at 904.
Id. at 905.
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similar suit in Missouri state courts failed.47 Dred Scott’s argument made,
more or less, three claims, each of which was necessary for Dred Scott to get
relief: (1) Dred Scott was a U.S. citizen resident in the State of Missouri, so
he could invoke the federal court’s diversity jurisdiction to sue his purported
owner, a resident of New York, for freedom and damages; (2) though
admittedly born enslaved, he had become free by living in Illinois or the
Northwest Territory where the law prohibited slavery; and (3) that such
freedom continued upon his return to Missouri.
Chief Justice Taney’s opinion rejected each proposition: (1) As a person
of African descent, Dred Scott could never be a citizen, whether born
enslaved or free; (2) congressional prohibition on slavery in the Northwest
territory was unconstitutional, and could not result in freedom because that
would take slaveowners’ property without due process of law, and (3) whether
an enslaved person became free after living in a free state or territory was a
matter of state law, which had been conclusively decided adversely to Dred
Scott in the courts of Missouri. As Jamal Greene explained, the third point
alone sufficed to explain the outcome of the case:
[I]t is easy to defend the result in the case—a loss for Scott—under thenexisting precedents and legal norms. In Strader v. Graham, decided six years
before Dred Scott, Taney had written (in dicta) that the laws of the domiciliary
state—not those of a state or territory of prior residence or inhabitation—
conclusively determined whether someone was slave or free.48

For its part, Strader recognized that “[e]very state has an undoubted right
to determine the status, or domestic and social condition, of the persons
domiciled within its territory; except in so far as the powers of the States in
this respect are restrained, or duties and obligations imposed upon them, by
the Constitution.”49
Strader addressed not the general distribution of rights, property, and
obligation, but the particular and significant state authority to determine that
47

48
49

Although the Missouri courts held that Scott was a slave, it was, they explained, for his benefit. See
Scott v. Emerson, 15 Mo. 576, 587 (1852) (“As to the consequences of slavery, they are much more
hurtful to the master than the slave. There is no comparison between the slave in the United States
and the cruel, uncivilized negro in Africa. When the condition of our slaves is contrasted with the
state of their miserable race in Africa; when their civilization, intelligence and instruction in
religious truths are considered, and the means now employed to restore them to the country from
which they have been torn, bearing with them the blessings of civilized life, we are almost
persuaded, that the introduction of slavery amongst us was, in the providences of God, who makes
the evil passions of men subservient to his own glory, a means of placing that unhappy race within
the pale of civilized nations.”).
Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 408 (2011).
Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. 82, 93 (1850). See generally Robert G. Schwemm, Strader v. Graham:
Kentucky’s Contribution to National Slavery Litigation and the Dred Scott Decision, 97 KY. L.J. 353 (2009).
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individuals or races were to be enslaved. Of course, after the Thirteenth
Amendment, states could not impose slavery, with the significant exception
of enslavement as punishment for crime. But Dow and Strader anticipated the
aggressively states’ rights-oriented doctrinal conclusion of Dred Scott, that the
federal Constitution left states the authority to determine personal status.
Criticism of Dred Scott turned in large part on its rhetoric as well as its
doctrine. As Jack Balkin and Sandy Levinson wrote of Dred Scott, “its most
notorious single passage is Taney’s declaration that ‘[Negroes were] beings
of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race,
either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no rights
which the white man was bound to respect . . . .’”50 Dow made clear that Malays
and by extension other non-whites could be enslaved if state law so provided.
To the extent that slaves had no rights that the white man was bound to
respect, the cases were complementary. Before emancipation and abolition,
Lorenzo Dow and Dred Scott seemed to be in the same boat.
Although Dred Scott did not cite Dow, Taney’s opinion in Dred Scott
borrowed from Dow’s second rationale, emphasizing African Americans’
exclusion from political participation. Taney explained that “[t]he words
‘people of the United States’ and ‘citizens’ are synonymous terms, and mean
the same thing. They both describe the political body who, according to our
republican institutions, form the sovereignty, and who hold the power and
conduct the Government through their representatives.”51 The Taney
decision in Dred Scott, as in Dow, relied on identification of the foreigners who
50
51

Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Thirteen Ways of Looking at Dred Scott, 82 CHI.–KENT L. REV.
49, 58 (2007).
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 404 (1857). See also id. at 406 (“It is true, every person, and
every class and description of persons, who were at the time of the adoption of the Constitution
recognized as citizens in the several States, became also citizens of this new political body; but none
other; it was formed by them, and for them and their posterity, but for no one else. And the personal
rights and privileges guaranteed to citizens of this new sovereignty were intended to embrace those
only who were then members of the several State communities, or who should afterwards by
birthright or otherwise become members, according to the provisions of the Constitution and the
principles on which it was founded.”); id. at 416 (“The legislation of the States therefore shows, in
a manner not to be mistaken, the inferior and subject condition of that race at the time the
Constitution was adopted, and long afterwards, throughout the thirteen States by which that
instrument was framed; and it is hardly consistent with the respect due to these States, to suppose
that they regarded at that time, as fellow-citizens and members of the sovereignty, a class of beings
whom they had thus stigmatized; whom, as we are bound, out of respect to the State sovereignties,
to assume they had deemed it just and necessary thus to stigmatize, and upon whom they had
impressed such deep and enduring marks of inferiority and degradation; or, that when they met in
convention to form the Constitution, they looked upon them as a portion of their constituents, or
designed to include them in the provisions so carefully inserted for the security and protection of
the liberties and rights of their citizens.”).
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were welcomed to this country as evidence of racial status. The Court
pointed to the Naturalization Act of 1790, which “confines the right of
becoming citizens ‘to aliens being free white persons’”; this language “shows that
citizenship at that time was perfectly understood to be confined to the white
race; and that they alone constituted the sovereignty in the Government.”52
Dow makes clear that this language excludes not only people of African
descent, but all non-whites.
In Dow, Taney explained that the defendant and other Malays would
have been excluded from political participation for a good reason: “The only
nations of the world which were then regarded, or perhaps entitled to be
regarded, as civilized, were the white Christian nations of Europe; and
certainly emigrants were not expected or desired from any other quarter.”53
52

53

Id. at 419–20 (italics in original). Justice Woodbury’s earlier comment that “[t]he progress of
civilization and commerce, and the whole character of our institutions and laws, are more and more
friendly to foreigners, regarding them more as brethren, of one blood and origin, and hope, rather
than barbarians and enemies” must be regarded as limited to immigrants of European “blood.”
Taylor v. Carpenter, 23 F. Cas. 744, 749–50 (C.C.D. Mass. 1846) (No. 13,785) (Woodbury, Cir.
J.).
United States v. Dow, 25 F. Cas. 901, 903 (C.C.D. Md. 1840) (No. 14,990); id. (“The political
community of the colony was composed entirely of white men professing the Christian religion;
they possessed all the powers of government granted by the charter.”). There is much other
evidence in the cases of the judicial view of the uncongeniality of other races to American liberty.
Wilcocks v. Phillips, 29 F. Cas. 1198, 1200 (C.C.D. Pa. 1843) (No. 17,639) (Baldwin, Cir. J.) (“China
is a country with which, as yet, we have had no treaties nor any diplomatick intercourse; and nearly
all that we know of its government, laws and institutions, is derived from the relations of merchants,
missionaries, and other persons who have been there. It would be too much, in the late or even in
the present condition of that country, to require a party to produce certified copies of its statutes.
The nation, it is well known, is isolated and peculiar; and we know of no way in which access could
be had to its records. These are facts which, in a case so notorious, the court will judicially notice.”);
Siemssen v. Bofer, 6 Cal. 250, 252–53 (1856) (“To assert the proposition that the President and
Senate are above the Constitution in this particular, and that they may do in this behalf what the
President and both Houses of Congress cannot do, would be destructive of the government; for,
under the cover of a resort to the treaty-making power, every outrage and injustice which illiberality
can conceive, or fanaticism execute, may be perpetrated. By a treaty with England, her free black
citizens may be introduced into South Carolina and other slave States of the Union, contrary to
the police regulations of those States. The Asiatic, and the convicts of the penal colonies of the
South Pacific, may be introduced into California on the same footing as the intelligent and virtuous
population of the more favored portions of Europe; and every branch of trade, agriculture,
commerce and manufactures, may be prostrated at the feet of this unconstitutional mastodon. Nay,
more; by a treaty of amity and friendship with the Emperor Soulouque, of Hayti, every slave in the
Southern States may be emancipated, and turned loose upon their present masters.”); State v.
Foreman, 16 Tenn. 256, 270–71 (1835) (“The tribes found inland have passed under the dominion,
and melted away under the influence and superior powers, mental and moral, of the white man, as
did the savages of Europe, Asia, and Africa pass under the dominion of the Romans, and as will
him of Australasia, Africa, and the Rocky Mountains be compelled to submit to the stroke of fate
sooner or later—to accept a master or perish. It is the destiny of man. Ignorance and division
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Dred Scott also drew on Taney’s judgments about the collective wisdom of the
civilized world. Taney explained that the broad language of the Declaration
of Independence “would not in any part of the civilized world be supposed
to embrace the negro race, which, by common consent, had been excluded
from civilized Governments and the family of nations, and doomed to
slavery.”54 This was “the state of public opinion in relation to that
unfortunate race, which prevailed in the civilized and enlightened portions
of the world at the time of the Declaration of Independence, and when the
Constitution of the United States was framed and adopted.”55 Resort to the

54

55

cannot stand before science and combination, nor can the civilized community exist by the side of
a savage foe . . . .”).
Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 410 (1857). As many scholars and others have noted, Taney was a poor
historian and legal analyst, at least in Dred Scott. His errors were highlighted in a remarkable
decision of the Maine Supreme Court within weeks of Dred Scott, rejecting the U.S. Supreme Court’s
conclusions and holding the opposite: “[i]t is therefore demonstrable, by recurring to the
constitution of this state, that those who framed the constitution, and the people by whom it was
adopted, regarded free colored persons (natives) as citizens of the United States, and entitled to the
right of suffrage.” Opinion of Judge Appleton, 44 Me. 521, 574 (1857). The Maine Court drew
on the dissents by Justices McLean and Curtis. They failed to persuade Taney, but protect the
honor and reputation of the colonies and states which made Blacks citizens. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at
533 (McLean, J., dissenting) (“In the argument, it was said that a colored citizen would not be an
agreeable member of society. This is more a matter of taste than of law. Several of the States have
admitted persons of color to the right of suffrage, and in this view have recognized them as citizens;
and this has been done in the slave as well as the free States. On the question of citizenship, it must
be admitted that we have not been very fastidious. Under the late treaty with Mexico, we have
made citizens of all grades, combinations, and colors. The same was done in the admission of
Louisiana and Florida.”); id. at 582 (Curtis, J., dissenting) (“It has been often asserted that the
Constitution was made exclusively by and for the white race. It has already been shown that in five
of the thirteen original States, colored persons then possessed the elective franchise, and were
among those by whom the Constitution was ordained and established. If so, it is not true, in point
of fact, that the Constitution was made exclusively by the white race. And that it was made
exclusively for the white race is, in my opinion, not only an assumption not warranted by anything
in the Constitution, but contradicted by its opening declaration, that it was ordained and established
by the people of the United States, for themselves and their posterity. And as free colored persons
were then citizens of at least five States, and so in every sense part of the people of the United States,
they were among those for whom and whose posterity the Constitution was ordained and
established.”).
Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 407 (1857).
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views of the “Christian” and “civilized” nations as authority was common in
this era in slave trade cases,56 Indian property cases,57 and others.58
Finally, as in Dow, Dred Scott concluded that because some persons of
African descent were enslaved, the rule of non-citizenship based on
enslavement and degradation applied to all members of the race. The status
or situation of individual people, the specific litigants, was irrelevant.
Dred Scott contains some language inconsistent with the argument that it
was about all non-whites. Dred Scott emphasized that its reasoning
applies to that class of persons only whose ancestors were negroes of the
African race, and imported into this country, and sold and held as slaves. . . .
[T]he court must be understood as speaking in this opinion of that class only,
that is, of those persons who are the descendants of Africans who were
imported into this country, and sold as slaves.59

56

57

58

59

Chief Justice Marshall, for example, explained why he upheld the general legality of the slave trade:
That the course of opinion on the slave trade should be unsettled, ought to excite no
surprise. The Christian and civilized nations of the world with whom we have most
intercourse, have all been engaged in it. However abhorrent this traffic may be to a mind
whose original feelings are not blunted by familiarity with the practice, it has been
sanctioned in modern times by the laws of all nations who possess distant colonies, each of
whom has engaged in it as a common commercial business which no other could rightfully
interrupt. It has claimed all the sanction which could be derived from long usage, and
general acquiescence. That trade could not be considered as contrary to the law of nations
which was authorized and protected by the laws of all commercial nations; the right to
carry on which was claimed by each, and allowed by each.
The Antelope, 23 U.S. 66, 114–15 (1825).
Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee, 41 U.S. 367, 409 (1842) (Taney, C.J.) (noting that “according to the
principles of international law, as understood by the then civilized powers of Europe, the Indian
tribes in the new world were regarded as mere temporary occupants of the soil, and the absolute
rights of property and dominion were held to belong to the European nation by which any
particular portion of the country was first discovered. Whatever forbearance may have been
sometimes practised towards the unfortunate aborigines, either from humanity or policy, yet the
territory they occupied was disposed of by the governments of Europe, at their pleasure, as if it had
been found without inhabitants.”).
Dinsman v. Wilkes, 53 U.S. 390, 405 (1851) (Taney, C.J.) (in an action for wrongful punishment of
a Marine, explaining “from whatever motives he had placed him out of the protection which the
ordinary place of confinement on shipboard afforded, in a prison belonging to and under the
control of an uncivilized people, it was his duty, through proper and trustworthy officers, to inquire
into his situation and treatment, and to see that it was not cruel or barbarous in any respect; and
that he did not suffer for the want of those necessaries which the humanity of civilized countries
always provides even for the hardened offender”); United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. 51, 86–87
(1833) (Marshall, C.J.) (“it is very unusual, even in cases of conquest, for the conqueror to do more
than to displace the sovereign and assume dominion over the country. The modern usage of
nations, which has become law, would be violated, that sense of justice and of right which is
acknowledged and felt by the whole civilized world would be outraged, if private property should
be generally confiscated, and private rights annulled . . . .”).
Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 403 (1857).
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In particular, Dred Scott distinguished the situation of Indians.60 Although
the Court would hold even after the Fourteenth Amendment that Indians
born in tribal relations were not birthright citizens,61 there was also no
question in Dred Scott that Congress could grant them the privilege of
naturalization.62
Do these passages demonstrate that Dred Scott was solely about the
degraded status of persons of African descent? One test of the accuracy of
Taney’s limitation is to examine whether Asians born in the United States
prior to the Fourteenth Amendment would have enjoyed birthright
citizenship.
One legal question in Dred Scott, eligibility to sue or be sued in diversity,
was not in doubt with respect to Malays or other Asians. Foreign-born
Asians were citizens or subjects of foreign states who could invoke federal
jurisdiction.63 On the other hand, because they were not white, Asians could
not become citizens by naturalization.64 The open question, before and after
the Fourteenth Amendment, was whether Asians born in the United States
were citizens.
Before the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court regarded the
question as undecided; under Dred Scott, “all white persons, at least” born in
the United States were citizens.65 In the 1880s and 1890s, the government
60

61
62

63

64
65

Id. at 403–04. See Addie C. Rolnick, The Promise of Mancari: Indian Political Rights As Racial Remedy,
86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 958, 977 (2011) (“The Court’s opinion in Dred Scott exemplifies not only how
both groups were excluded from U.S. citizenship, but also how the particular racial stereotypes
associated with each group led the Court to cast their exclusions differently.”).
Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 109 (1884). See generally Bethany R. Berger, Birthright Citizenship on Trial:
Elk v. Wilkins and United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1185 (2016).
Dred Scott,, 60 U.S. at 404 (1857) (“But they may, without doubt, like the subjects of any other foreign
Government, be naturalized by the authority of Congress, and become citizens of a State, and of
the United States; and if an individual should leave his nation or tribe, and take up his abode among
the white population, he would be entitled to all the rights and privileges which would belong to an
emigrant from any other foreign people.”).
U.S. Const., Art. III, § 2 (diversity jurisdiction extends to cases and controversies “between a State,
or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens, or Subjects.”). See Hinckley v. Byrne, 12 F.
Cas. 194, 196 (C.C.D. Cal. 1867) (No. 6,510) (“Admitting the facts as affirmatively stated in the
plea, the court has jurisdiction, because the plaintiff is a citizen of the state of Massachusetts, and
the defendants, Soo Chung, Hip Hing and Kroning, are subjects of a foreign state.”); Fisher v.
Consequa, 9 F. Cas. 120 (C.C.D. Pa. 1809) (No. 4,816) (Washington, Cir. J.) (upholding jurisdiction
over “Hong merchant at Canton”). U.S.-born Indians, however, were not aliens for diversity
jurisdiction purposes. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 20 (1831) (“The court has bestowed
its best attention on this question, and, after mature deliberation, the majority is of opinion that an
Indian tribe or nation within the United States is not a foreign state in the sense of the constitution,
and cannot maintain an action in the courts of the United States.”).
See infra note 107, and accompanying text.
United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 674–75 (1898).
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repeatedly excluded U.S.-born persons of Chinese ancestry at the border on
the ground that they were not citizens. They were admitted only after resort
to the courts.66
The citizenship of U.S.-born persons of Chinese ancestry also divided the
post-Reconstruction law review writers. Some argued that the language of
the Fourteenth Amendment plainly made them citizens,67 while others
contended that the children of Chinese born here were not citizens because
not fully “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States.68
Finally, in 1898, there was a Supreme Court test. The Department of
Justice insisted that “Chinese children born in this country” did not “share
with the descendants of the patriots of the American Revolution the exalted
qualification of being eligible to the Presidency of the nation, conferred by
the Constitution in recognition of the importance and dignity of citizenship
by birth,” and if they did, “then verily there has been a most degenerate

66

67

68

See In re Wy Shing, 36 F. 553 (N.D. Cal. 1888); In re Yung Sing Hee, 36 F. 437(C.C.D. Or. 1888);
Ex parte Chin King, 35 F. 354 (C.C.D. Or. 1888); In re Look Tin Sing, 21 F. 905 (C.C.D. Cal. 1884)
(Field, Cir. J.).
See D. H. Pingrey, Citizens, Their Rights and Immunities, 36 AM. L. REG. 539, 540 (1888) (“So a
Chinese, born of alien parents within the dominion and jurisdiction of the United States, who reside
therein, and not engaged in any diplomatic official capacity, under the Chinese government, is a
citizen of the United States.”); Thomas P. Stoney, Citizenship, 34 AM. L. REG. 1, 7 (1886) (“The
court [in Look Tin Sing] could have made no other decision under the constitution. The child when
born was absolutely and completely subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, and so were his
parents, if at the time they were both in this country.”).
See George D. Collins, Citizenship by Birth, 29 AM. L. REV. 385, 391–92 (1895) (“the children born
in California, of Chinese parents, are at the moment of birth subject to a foreign power, China
claiming as subjects the children born abroad of Chinese parents . . . .”); George D. Collins, Are
Persons Born Within the United States Ipso Facto Citizens Thereof?, 18 AM. L. REV. 831, 834 (1884) (“Their
children born upon American soil are Chinese from their very birth in all respects, just as much so
as though they had been born and reared in China; they inherit the same prejudices, the same
customs, habits, and methods of their ancestors; in short, they are subject to the same civilization
and adhere to it with as much tenacity as did their forefathers. Now it is evident that such persons
are utterly unfit, wholly incompetent, to exercise the important privileges of an American citizen, a
title which it was the aim of our ancestors to make as proud as that of king; and yet under the
common-law rule they would be citizens.”); Prentiss Webster, Acquisition of Citizenship, 23 AM. L.
REV. 759, 772 (1889) (commenting on Ex parte Chin King, 35 F. 354, 355 (C.C.D. Or. 1888):
“Suppose that China has a similar rule [of citizenship by parental descent], certainly the positions
of the United States and China would be the same in this regard; and under this rule Chin King
would be held to be a citizen of China when in China, and a citizen of the United States when in
the United States, if the rule jure soli is to govern. Certainly such an anomaly cannot be
considered.”). Scholar Collins would become embroiled in a notorious bigamy and perjury case,
which went to the U.S. Supreme Court and led to his disbarment and imprisonment. In re Collins,
206 P. 990, 993 (Cal. 1922); Ex parte Collins, 90 P. 827, 829 (Cal. 1907), aff’d sub nom. Collins v.
O’Neil, 214 U.S. 113 (1909).
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departure from the patriotic ideals of our forefathers; and surely in that case
American citizenship is not worth having.”69
Nevertheless, in Wong Kim Ark v. United States, the Court found that
American-born Chinese were U.S. citizens.70 Among other considerations it
found persuasive, the Court noted that if China’s claim of citizenship to
children born overseas meant they were not U.S. citizens “would be to deny
citizenship to thousands of persons of English, Scotch, Irish, German, or
other European parentage, who have always been considered and treated as
citizens of the United States.”71
But Wong Kim Ark required reargument, suggesting the difficulty of the
issue. The ultimate decision was not unanimous. Chief Justice Fuller and
Justice Harlan dissented, explaining:
Considering the circumstances surrounding the framing of the constitution,
I submit that it is unreasonable to conclude that “natural-born citizen”
applied to everybody born within the geographical tract known as the United
States, irrespective of circumstances; and that the children of foreigners,
happening to be born to them while passing through the country, whether
of royal parentage or not, or whether of the Mongolian, Malay, or other
race, were eligible to the Presidency . . . .72

Remarkably, then, decades after the Fourteenth Amendment became
law, a justice noted for his dedication to civil rights could conclude that
Asians born in in the U.S. were not citizens.
If the question had arisen before enactment of the Fourteenth
Amendment, it is certainly plausible that other members of the Dred Scott
majority would have agreed with Fuller, a dissenter in Fong Yue Ting, and
Harlan, the great dissenter himself, that formerly enslavable unnaturalized
Asians and their children were not part of the people of the United States.
This view is consistent with the with what may be the central conclusion of
Dred Scott: “[C]itizenship at that time was perfectly understood to be confined
to the white race; and that they alone constituted the sovereignty in the
Government”—language foreshadowed by Dow’s conclusion that “[t]he
political community of the colony was composed entirely of white men
professing the Christian religion; they possessed all the powers of government

69

70
71
72

See Brief for the United States at 34, United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898) (No.
449), reprinted in 14 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 37 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975).
United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898), aff’g In re Wong Kim Ark, 71 F. 382 (N.D.
Cal. 1896).
Id. at 694.
Id. at 715 (Fuller, C.J., joined by Harlan, J., dissenting).
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granted by the charter.” Unless Asians were regarded as civilized white
Christians, and if Dow was right that Asians would not have been part of the
political community, much of the logic of Dred Scott applied to them with full
force, including its reasoning about ineligibility for birthright citizenship.
II. DRED SCOTT AND THE JURISPRUDENCE OF FREE PEOPLE OF COLOR
From a modern perspective, after 1868 Dred Scott seemed as dead as the
Whig Party. Chief Justice Taney had gone to his reward, African Americans
had been made citizens by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the
Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery. Yet, Dred Scott’s embrace of
Strader, like Dow’s recognition of state evidence rules, meant that the principle
of the case remained at issue where there was a contest over the legal
regulation of the rights of non-whites. This may explain the postReconstruction revival of both interest in Dred Scott, and in Taney’s
reputation.
Justice Harlan’s famous dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson predicted that “the
judgment this day rendered will, in time, prove to be quite as pernicious as
the decision made by this tribunal in the Dred Scott Case.”73 There was
wisdom in recognizing the deep connection between the cases.74 Yet, during
Jim Crow, Dred Scott was hardly anathema to courts. The Supreme Court
uncritically relied on it in support of originalism75 and territorial powers.76
In 1913, the Kentucky Supreme Court concluded that state pension

73
74

75

76

Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Ed.
of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
This passage suggests the possibility of a certain overlap in the views of Harlan and Taney about
white supremacy: “The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. And so it
is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth, and in power. So, I doubt not, it will
continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great heritage, and holds fast to the principles of
constitutional liberty.” Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting). In fairness to
Harlan, it is perfectly possible to read this as racial flattery rather than a genuine prediction.
See, e.g., South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 449 (1905), in which the Court stated:
As said by Mr. Chief Justice Taney in Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393, 426, 15 L. ed. 691,
709: “It is not only the same in words, but the same in meaning, and delegates the same
powers to the government, and reserves and secures the same rights and privileges to the
citizen; and as long as it continues to exist in its present form, it speaks not only in the same
words, but with the same meaning and intent with which it spoke when it came from the
hands of its framers, and was voted on and adopted by the people of the United States.
Any other rule of construction would abrogate the judicial character of this court, and
make it the mere reflex of the popular opinion or passion of the day.”
DeLima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 196 (1901) (“But whatever be the source of this power, its
uninterrupted exercise by Congress for a century, and the repeated declarations of this court, have
settled the law that the right to acquire territory involves the right to govern and dispose of it. That
was stated by Chief Justice Taney in the Dred Scott Case.”).
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payments to Confederate veterans were valid public expenditures in part
based on northern opposition to Dred Scott—as well as, among other things,
the fact that state funds were used to erect “[m]onuments . . . to Generals
John C. Breckenridge, John H. Morgan, and other distinguished
Confederates.”77
Jim Crow-era law reviews were effusive about Taney’s jurisprudential
excellence, not only in general, but with respect to Dred Scott itself. A former
Confederate wrote in 1912: “[N]otwithstanding the calumny and abuse
which were heaped upon the Chief Justice because of his decision in the Dred
Scott case, as far as we have been able to discover, not one statement of fact
or principle of law as set forth by him in that opinion has ever been
successfully controverted.”78 In 1923, F. Dumont Smith, a prominent
Kansas lawyer wrote The Story of the Constitution79 for the American Bar
Association, a nationally-distributed pamphlet which told “the story of our
race,” declaring that “[n]o racial history is more romantic or fascinating.”80
That year, in the Texas Law Review, he defended Taney’s view of history,
observing: “The experience of one hundred and fifty years since that time
[the framing of the Constitution] has shown us that the Negro in the mass
will never be fitted for citizenship.”81 Another lawyer wrote that “[t]he
decision in the Dred Scott case was sound in principle. When the tumult of
anger and outrage, engendered by the slavery question had passed away, and
judges were confronted with the principles announced by that decision, they
did not disregard it.”82 Many other journals punished defenses of Taney’s

77

78
79

80
81
82

Bosworth v. Harp, 157 S.W. 1084, 1087 (Ky. 1913). See also Ex parte Reynolds, 20 F. Cas. 582, 584
(C.C.W.D. Ark. 1879) (No. 11,719) (“The supreme court of the United States again gave its views
of the status of the Indian in the case of Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. [60 U. S.] 403.”); In re
Silkman, 84 N.Y.S. 1025, 1031 (App. Div. 1903) (Woodward, J., concurring) (“‘The words “people
of the United States” and “citizens” are synonymous terms, and mean the same thing,’ say the court
in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 404, 15 L. Ed. 691. ‘They both describe the political body who,
according to our republican institutions, form the sovereignty, and who hold the power and conduct
the government through their representatives. They are what we familiarly call the “sovereign
people,” and every citizen is one of this people, and a constituent member of this sovereignty.’”).
George L. Christian, Roger Brooke Taney, 46 AM. L. REV. 1, 14 (1912).
F. DUMONT SMITH, THE STORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (A.B.A. Citizenship Comm. 1923),
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=njp.32101065096768&view=1up&seq=1&q1=race
[https://perma.cc/E54G-3BAA].
Id. at 12.
F. Dumont Smith, Roger Brooke Taney, 1 TEX. L. REV. 261, 271 (1922–1923).
Morris M. Cohn, The Dred Scott Case in the Light of Later Events, 18 VA. L. REG. 401, 409 (1912).
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reputation and the decision.83 To be sure, others suggested Dred Scott was
wrongly decided, but even they tended to be diplomatic.84
To many Americans, including African Americans, Dred Scott had not
been repudiated by the Civil War or Reconstruction. After the Civil War,
many commentators, both supporters of racial classifications and opponents,
described the legal rights of African Americans as akin to what they enjoyed
under Dred Scott More surprising was that the situation of Chinese and

83

84

See, e.g., Henry K. Braley, Roger Brooke Taney, Chief Justice of the United States, 22 GREEN BAG 149, 164
(1910) (“One by one the imputations cast upon him have been shown to have been groundless, by
Tyler, Curtis, Reverdy Johnson, Clarkson N. Potter, Blaine, Carson, James Ford Rhodes, Professor
Mikell and others, until the eclipse of this malign influence has passed from off his fame, and in the
firmament of our jurisprudence his reputation as a great jurist and upright judge glows with steady
radiance.”); Horace H. Hagan, Dred Scott Decision, 15 GEO. L.J. 95, 112 (1927) (“Everywhere the
brazen and infamous lie was spread that the Court, speaking through the Chief Justice, had decided
that the Negro had no rights which the white man was bound to respect.”); id. at 114 (“At the
present time, the clouds of misrepresentation and misunderstanding that have so long hovered
around the great Chief Justice have almost entirely disappeared. The magnificence of Taney’s
contribution to the judicial annals of our country is no longer a matter of dispute.”); Monroe
Johnson, Taney and Lincoln, 16 A.B.A. J. 499, 499 (1930) (“The public was content to accept, without
question, the newspaper version; whereas a reading of the opinion, itself, would have shown that
Taney had not stated his own views regarding the status of the negro but had merely described the
conditions which he believed to have existed at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.”);
Taney, Roger B., 2 CHI. L. TIMES 317, 326 (1888) (“Much has been said about the Dred Scott case,
and the Chief Justice has been assailed in the bitterest manner. It has been said that his name
would go down to posterity covered with infamy. But the fact is, that in rendering the decision in
regard to the political status of the plaintiff, he voiced the sentiment of the then majority of the
American people.”).
See, e.g., Henry S. Barker, The Dred Scott Case, 3 KY. L.J. 1, 10 (1914) (“Surely it cannot be truthfully
said in the light of these facts that, at the time of the Declaration of Independence and the formation
of the Constitution, slavery was viewed by the civilized world as being altogether right and
expedient, and that negroes had no rights which the white man was bound to respect.”); Charles
Noble Gregory, Great Judicial Character Roger Brooke Taney, 18 YALE L.J. 10, 21 (1908–1909) (“One
may accord to Taney’s opinion logic and learning, but one cannot concede to it an enlightened and
forward looking spirit. He was seventy-nine years old when he wrote this opinion, and that he
should seek to crystalize the views of the past, rather than the feeling of the present or the conviction
of the future, was natural to his age and his origin. At a like age we will be equally incapable of
changing our views as to the ownership in horses and cattle if the world, in its advance, ever
recognizes, as I sometimes hope it will, their inalienable rights.”); Francis R. Jones, Roger Brooke
Taney, 14 GREEN BAG 1, 7 (1902) (“It is not a pleasant thing to criticise a great magistrate for
unjudicial conduct, but I have seen no explanation, and can conceive of none, which satisfactorily
explains his attitude and conduct in the Dred Scott case.”); Walter George Smith, Roger Brooke Taney,
47 AM. L. REG. 201, 230 (1899) (“He was even known to stop a child and help her with her bucket
of water in the streets of Washington when he was in high position and she but a slave, the child of
a despised race. [But] [l]et it be finally admitted, in the light of history, that, with intentions too
pure and lofty to be doubted, six Justices of the Supreme Court committed an error, and with their
chief must bear the responsibility to a greater or less extent. The majority went aside from the true
path and fell into a pit. Their conclusions were riddled by the inexorable logic of Curtis and
McLean, and served no other purpose than to make a solemn warning to their successors.”).
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Indians was described in the same terms. Typical is an editorial in the
African American newspaper The Appeal following the Supreme Court’s
holding that racial deportation of noncitizens was permissible:
The popular expression ‘This is a white man’s country’ is an extension of
Judge Taney’s notorious dictum ‘Negroes have no rights that white men are
bound to respect.’ As thus amplified, the dictum includes the Chinaman and
Indian as well as the Afro-American, and the Chinese Exclusion Bill is an
instance of its practical application.85

Other notable examples include Mark Twain’s discussion of violence
against Chinese in 1860s California,86 judicial decisions addressing antiChinese legislation,87 debates in Congress and state legislative bodies,88
African American newspaper discussion of Lum v. Rice,89 upholding

85
86

87

88

89

Editorial, APPEAL: A NAT’L AFRO-AM. NEWSPAPER (St. Paul & Minneapolis, Minn.), June 18,
1892, at 2.
Mark Twain, Disgraceful Prosecution of a Boy, GALAXY 722, 723 (May 1870) (“It was in this way that
the boy found out that a Chinaman had no rights that any man was bound to respect; that he had
no sorrows that any man was bound to pity; that neither his life nor his liberty was worth the
purchase of a penny when a white man needed a scapegoat; that nobody loved Chinamen, nobody
befriended them, nobody spared them suffering when it was convenient to inflict it; everybody,
individuals, communities, the majesty of the State itself, joined in hating, abusing, and persecuting
these humble strangers.”) https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=pst.000066654452&view=1up&
seq=749 [https://perma.cc/T2WK-Q9T4].
The Stockton Laundry Case, 26 F. 611, 612–13 (C.C.D. Cal. 1886) (“Indeed, if this ordinance be
valid, it is difficult to perceive what rights the people of California have which a municipal
corporation is bound to respect. Of course, no one can in fact doubt the purpose of this ordinance.
It means, ‘The Chinese must go;’ and, in order that they shall go, it is made to encroach upon one
of the most sacred rights of citizens of the state of California,—of the Caucasian race as well as
upon the rights of the Mongolian.”); Chapman v. Toy Long, 5 F. Cas. 497, 499 (C.C.D. Or. 1876)
(No. 2,610) (discussing “‘the heathen Chinee,’ who appear to have no rights on Poorman creek that
a miner is bound to respect.”).
19 CONG. REC. 8984 (1888) (Remarks of Sen. Randall L. Gibson) (Senators supporting Chinese
Exclusion “have, in effect, invoked the Senate to re-enact the Dred Scott decision, and to take the
ground with respect to the Chinese race upon which that famous decision rested in respect to the
colored people in this country. They who hold with the Declaration of Independence, that all men
are created free and equal, find themselves under an imperious necessity, political and social, of
their people to adapt their doctrine to the exclusion of the Chinese race.”); DEBATES AND
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
CONVENED AT THE CITY OF SACRAMENTO, SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 1878 720 (1878–1879)
(remarks of Eli Blackmer) (“While I am anxious to do all that is legal, I do believe that even the
Chinaman, obnoxious as he is, has some rights that the white man is bound to respect.”). Another
possible reference came in the Virginia Constitutional Convention of 1901–02: “What about John
Chinaman under the protecting agis of the Constitution of the United States? If he has any rights
on earth except to wash clothes and smoke opium I do not know what they are. (Laughter.)”
REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, STATE
OF VIRGINIA, HELD IN THE CITY OF RICHMOND, JUNE 12, 1901, TO JUNE 26, 1902 77 (1906).
275 U.S. 78 (1927).
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segregation of Chinese students in Mississippi,90 and Harvard Law Professor
Zechariah Chafee Jr.’s analysis of the due process rights of Chinese
immigrants under federal law.91 Later nineteenth and early twentieth

90

91

Running True to Form, PITT. COURIER, Dec. 10, 1927, at A8 (“Standing above all law and all
legislatures, the United States Supreme Court has ever been the bulwark of conservatism. In 1857
it informed the world that “A Negro has no rights that a white man is bound to respect,’ and in
1927, it tells a Chinese citizen the same thing in a decision handed down by Chief Justice Taft on
November 21.”); see also Kelly Miller, Chinese in Negro Schools, N.Y. AMSTERDAM NEWS, Dec. 7,
1927, at 20 (“A taste of Dred Scott is still in the mouths of the people.”).
ZECHARIAH CHAFEE JR., FREEDOM OF SPEECH 255 (1920) (“It is all very well to say that only
Communist citizens run this risk anyway, and that they and Chinese citizens have ‘no rights that a
white man is bound to respect.’”). Other notable commentators compared the Chinese Exclusion
laws to the fugitive slave laws. Edward S. Corwin, Constitutional Law in 1921–1922, 16 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 612 n.54 (1922) (“The position of such Chinese is akin to that of people of color who
were arrested as fugitive slaves, before the Civil War. See Prigg v. Pa., 16 Pet. 539.”); Henry S.
Cohn & Harvey Gee, “No, No, No, No!”: Three Sons of Connecticut Who Opposed the Chinese Exclusion Acts,
3 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 58 (2003) (discussing Senator Joseph Roswell Hawley who stated that
the whole thing looked to him like “old fugitive-slave law.”) (13 CONG. REC. 3264 (1882)).
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century newspapers92 and scholarship93 routinely invoked Dred Scott in the
context of Chinese.94
92

Hard on the Chinese, HAW. STAR, Dec. 10, 1900, at 1 (“Judging from the present unfriendly attitude
of the Americans it looks as if the Chinese, even in Hawaii, are ‘up against it.’ In fact they are almost
as badly off as was the negro in the fifties when the Dred Scott decision was handed down,
practically holding that a negro had no rights which a white man was bound to respect.”); The Early
Courts, L.A. HERALD, Jan. 6, 1899, at 4 (“At that early period in the judicial history of California
the dictum of the supreme court of the United States, given by Judge Taney in the Dred Scott case,
that a slave had no rights which a white man was bound to respect, was quite commonly held in
California with regard to the Chinese. It was quite difficult to convict any white man who should
kill a Chinaman.”); Gone to the Jury, L.A. HERALD, Apr. 16, 1898, at 12 (“The real question at issue
was . . . whether a Chinaman has any rights under the laws of the country that a man in a
policeman’s uniform is bound to respect.”); They Will Fight: Chinese Raise a Protective Fund and Retain a
Lawyer, L.A. TIMES, May 4, 1897 (“Frank F. Davis, attorney for the Chinaman, took the stand that
the whole case was an outcropping of the too-common feeling that a Chinaman was a dog, with no
rights that anyone was bound to respect.”); Pan-Presbyterian Council: The Clergyman Who Saved Mrs.
Grimason’s Life Publicly Thanked, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1892, at 2 (noting that Dr. Robert J. George
“said the record of the United States in regard to the Chinese was as infamous as the Dred Scott
decision. How could they talk of Christianizing Chinamen when they would not let them come
into the country?”); No Law for the Chinese, 2 PUB. OP. 498 1887 (“[I]t appears that the Chinaman in
this country who is not a citizen has no rights which the white man is bound to respect.”); Editorial
Notes, WEEKLY ARGUS (Rock Island, Ill.), Mar. 18, 1886, at 2 (“The storm now raging has been
brewing ever since Dennis Kearney uttered the ominous threat ‘The Chinese must go.’ Professional
‘agitators’ . . . have added fuel to the flames from time, until a sentiment has been fulminated in the
breasts of many toiling laborers that Chinamen have few if any rights a white man is bound to
respect.”); The Anti-Chinese Crusade, DAILY ARGUS (Rock Island, Ill.), Mar. 23, 1877, at 2 (“It was
long a standing reproach to the national character that there was one section of the union where a
negro had no rights a white man was bound to respect. That reproach has been exchanged for
another. On the Pacific coast the members of a race as much above the African as the African is
above the gorilla are actually denied the right to live and work.”); A Brutal Outrage: Has a Chinaman
Any Rights Which an American Citizen of Foreign Birth Is Bound to Respect?—A Policeman Who Believed Not,
CHI. DAILY TRIB., Nov 23, 1873, at 16 (describing the abuse of a migrant at the hands of police);
Chinese Charity, WATERTOWN WEEKLY REPUB. (Wis.), Nov. 22, 1871, at 4 (“The Chinese are,
according to the Los Angeles creed, but an inferior race, fit to be mobbed, persecuted and
murdered, with no rights which a white man is bound to respect, and this is the way they prove
it.”); A Perjured Jury—Killing Chinamen No Murder, S.F. CHRON., Jun. 10, 1871, at 2 (“The fact that a
sworn jury, in the face of incontrovertible facts, could perjure themselves to shield one of their own
blood from the consequences of crime, is a terrible commentary on the lessons which have been
taught by those who say that the Chinese have no rights which the white man is bound to respect.”);
Will Discussion Do Good?, TRINITY WEEKLY J. (Cal.), Sept. 17, 1870, at 2 (“The outcry against the
Chinese made by politicians is but a repetition of the old cry that ‘the black man had no rights, that
the white man was bound to respect.’”); The New Dodge, JACKSON STANDARD (Ohio), June 9, 1870
at 2 (“It is a cardinal point in the California Democratic creed that ‘a Chinaman has no rights that
a white man is bound to respect,’ as it has heretofore been the ‘infallible dogma’ of Democrats,
everywhere, that the ‘negro had no rights that the white man was bound to respect.’”); Murder
Tolerated and Encouraged, STOCKTON DAILY INDEPENDENT (Cal.), May 6, 1870, at 2 (attributing
murder of Chinese person in part to “the idea that no other race has rights that Caucasians are
bound to respect”); San Francisco: Black Made White by the Supreme Court of California, A Chinaman Has
No Rights Which a Negro Is Bound to Respect, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 2, 1869; Persistent Brutality, DAILY
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Indians were also said to be subject to Dred Scott. Many have called the
Court’s 1903 decision in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock95 the Dred Scott of federal Indian

93

94

95

MORNING CHRON. (S.F.), Nov. 18, 1868, at 2 (“The majority of the [police] force are probably of
the opinion that ‘Chaynaymin and naygurs’ have no rights that white ruffians are bound to
respect.”); Chinamen in the Cars, DAILY DRAMATIC CHRON. (S.F.), July 3, 1868, at 2 (“It is a fact not
generally known by San Franciscans, that over in Oakland, Chinamen have ‘rights which whites
are bound to respect.’”).
NAJIA AARIM-HERIOT, CHINESE IMMIGRANTS, AFRICAN AMERICANS, AND RACIAL ANXIETY IN
THE UNITED STATES, 1848–82, 38 (2003) (“Or, as a forty-niner stated in 1852, Americans were
confident that the Chinese had ‘no rights that a white man [was] bound to respect.’”); MARY R.
COOLIDGE, CHINESE IMMIGRATION 258–59 (1909) (“the tradition that a Chinaman had no rights
which white men were bound to respect was being established” in 1860s); 4 THEODORE HENRY
HITTELL, HISTORY OF CALIFORNIA 618 (1898) (“They seems to have a notion that the Chinese
were not human beings and had no rights which anybody was bound to or ought to respect.”);
AARON M. POWELL, PERSONAL REMINISCENCES OF THE ANTI-SLAVERY AND OTHER REFORMS
AND REFORMERS 273 (1899) (“We are sending missionaries abroad to China, but what are we
teaching by example in America with reference to the Chinese except the Godless doctrine that
they have no rights which we are bound to respect?”); S. WELLS WILLIAMS, CHINESE
IMMIGRATION 46 (1879) (“The laws of California declare that the Chinese are Indians and aliens,
and her legislators have treated them as if they had no rights which we were bound to respect.”);
Morris M. Cohn, The Dred Scott Case in the Light of Later Events, 46 AM. L. REV. 548, 557 (1912)
(noting that Pacific Coast states “have, notwithstanding the lessons in liberty taught by the civil war,
found ways to carry through legislation, in the halls of Congress, which put the contention of the
judges in the Dred Scott case entirely in the shade, and make slavery a lesser evil.”); Constitutional,
but Evil, 1 AM. LAWYER 4 (1893) (noting that Fong Yue Ting v. United States “with its dissentient
accompaniment reminds one forcibly of the event of the Dred Scott decision by the same court.”).
Some contemporary scholars make the same point. See ROBERT G. LEE, ORIENTALS: ASIAN
AMERICANS IN POPULAR CULTURE 49 (1999) (“In California, . . . until a year after the Federal
Civil Rights Bill in 1868, a Chinaman had no rights that the man was bound to respect.”); Mae M.
Ngai, Birthright Citizenship and the Alien Citizen, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2521, 2522–23 (2007) (“Asiatic
exclusion was the most complete race-based legal exclusion from citizenship since Dred Scott and
was instituted, significantly, in the 1880s, after the Fourteenth Amendment nullified Dred Scott.”);
Peter H. Schuck, Affirmative Action: Past, Present, and Future, 20 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 68 (2002)
(“The Chinese Exclusion Case, sometimes called the Dred Scott decision for Asians, rivals
the Japanese internment cases for harshness and injustice.”).
Relatedly, some authorities referred to Western treatment of China in a similar way. 2 HOSEA
BALLOU MORSE, THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF THE CHINESE EMPIRE: THE PERIOD OF
SUBMISSION 1861–1893 357 (1917) (citing Dred Scott; “It is only on the ground that an Asiatic nation
has no rights which the white man is bound to respect that the Course of France is to be explained.”)
https://archive.org/details/internationalrel02mors/page/356/mode/2up/search/bound+to+re
spect. See also Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, H.R. EXEC. DOC. No. 42-1, at
pt. 186 (1871) (“Foreigners residing here are much too prone to exhibit by acts, if not by words,
their belief in the doctrine that ‘a Chinaman has no rights that a white man is bound to respect.’”);
W.E.B. DUBOIS, W.E.B. DUBOIS ON ASIA: CROSSING THE WORLD COLOR LINE 37 (2005)
(speaking of the U.N., “[t]here will be six hundred million colored and black folk inhabiting colonies
owned by white nations, who will have no rights that white people are bound to respect.”).
187 U.S. 553 (1903).
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law.96 Lone Wolf held “that Congress could unilaterally abrogate tribal treaty
rights and exchange their territory for allotments and money.”97 The year it
was decided, Senator Matthew Quay called Lone Wolf “the Dred Scott
decision No. 2, except that in this case the victim is red instead of black. It
practically inculcates the doctrine that the red man has no rights which the
man is bound to respect, and, that no treaty or contract made with him is
binding.”98
Although Asian “coolies” were for practical purposes enslaved in parts of
the Americas such as Cuba,99 and the story of Indian slavery in the Americas
is now beginning to be told,100 in the United States, African slavery is a
unique historical crime. So too, in a different way, is the brutality and
treachery associated with treatment of Indian nations by the United States.
Nevertheless, there is a perfectly reasonable argument that the allusions
to Dred Scott in connection with Indians and Asians were neither metaphorical
nor hyperbolic. In this era, authors in leading law reviews argued that the
Reconstruction Amendments were void, or, at the very least, bad policy.101
96

97
98
99

100

101

Stacy L. Leeds, The More Things Stay the Same: Waiting on Indian Law’s Brown v. Board of Education,
38 TULSA L. REV. 73, 86 n.3 (2002) (“The day Lone Wolf was handed down, January 5, 1903, might
be called one of the blackest days in the history of the American Indian, the Indians’ Dred Scott
decision.”) (quoting Sioux Nation of Indians v. U.S., 601 F.2d 1157, 1173 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (Nichols,
J., concurring), aff’d sub nom. U.S. v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980)); Robert N.
Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113, 182 (2002)
(arguing that there is no federal supremacy clause for Indian tribes); see generally, Joseph William
Singer, Well Settled?: The Increasing Weight of History in American Indian Land Claims, 28 GA. L. REV. 481,
484 (1994); Sharon L. O’Brien, Freedom of Religion in Indian Country, 56 MONT. L. REV. 451, 480
n.190 (1995)); Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U.
PA. L. REV. 195, 221 (1984) (“Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock . . . has been called ‘the Indians’ Dred Scott
decision.’”).
Bethany R. Berger, Red: Racism and the American Indian, 56 UCLA L. REV. 591, 630 (2009).
Id. at 630 (citing DAVID E. WILKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE U.S. SUPREME
COURT: THE MASKING OF JUSTICE 116 (1997) (citing 36 CONG. REC. 2024 (1903)).
See generally, MOON-HO JUNG, COOLIES AND CANE: RACE, LABOR AND SUGAR IN THE AGE OF
EMANCIPATION 4 (2006) (describing the historical origins and transmutations of coolies in
American culture); ELLIOTT YOUNG, ALIEN NATION: CHINESE IMMIGRATION IN THE AMERICAS
FROM THE COOLIE ERA THROUGH WORLD WAR II 94 (2014).
ANDRÉS RESÉNDEZ, THE OTHER SLAVERY: THE UNCOVERED STORY OF INDIAN
ENSLAVEMENT IN AMERICA (2016) (describing the history of Indian enslavement from the time of
the conquistadors to the early twentieth century).
See Arthur W. Machen, Jr., Is the Fifteenth Amendment Void?, 23 HARV. L. REV. 169, 178 (1910)
(describing the Fifteenth Amendment as a forcible annexation to the southern States); John R. Dos
Passos, The Negro Question, 12 YALE L.J. 467, 472 (1903) (proposing to “plac[e] in the hands of the
individual States the power to control the question, to determine and announce who shall and who
shall not be entitled to vote within their respective borders. This means a retrograde movement in
our constitutional history. It means we must retrace our steps and undo organic legislation which
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Gilbert Thomas Stephenson’s 1910 book Race Distinction in American Law took
nearly 400 pages to catalog the ways in which U.S. law accepted the
invitation to classify on the basis of race.102 He explained “[a]ttention will be
directed not only to the Negro but to other races in the United States—the
Mongolian in the Far West and the Indian in the Southwest.”103 Pauli
Murray’s 1950 masterpiece States’ Laws on Race and Color was almost twice as
long.104 Dred Scott seemed to be right, that with only limited exceptions, states
had the authority to regulate the status of their citizens, including along racial
lines.
Whites were a majority in most states of the Union. In the former
Confederate states where African Americans were a majority, or even a
substantial minority, they were disenfranchised.105 Accordingly, in all cases,
whites made rules to govern themselves, but also decided the status of people
of color. As Dow suggested, in the century after reconstruction whites were
the master race, as Dred Scott held, whites constituted the sovereignty in
government. This power was deployed.
The point of what follows is not to recount every form of discrimination
against people of color, nor to deny significant variation across jurisdictions
and over time. Indeed, as some states enforced segregation, others passed
civil rights laws.106 Nor is it to contend that non-white groups suffered
identically, or equally, or to propose a metric for comparative injury. In
addition, groups coded as white or with many white members also
experienced various forms of public and private discrimination, including
Southern and Eastern Europeans, Jewish and Muslim people, Jehovah’s
Witnesses, and Latter Day Saints. Nevertheless, what follows is designed to
suggest that Chief Justice Taney’s theory that the states and federal

102
103

104
105

106

was hastily enacted after the rebellion; to take back that which was given.”). For a contemporary
evaluation of these arguments, see John Harrison, The Lawfulness of the Reconstruction Amendments, 68
U. CHI. L. REV. 375 (2001).
GILBERT THOMAS STEPHENSON, RACE DISTINCTIONS IN AMERICAN LAW (1910).
Id. at 6–7 (“Most of the discussion will necessarily be of the distinctions between Caucasians and
Negroes, but as distinctions applicable to Mongolians and Indians arise, they will be mentioned to
show that race consciousness is not confined to any one section or race.”).
PAULI MURRAY, STATES’ LAWS ON RACE AND COLOR (Univ. Ga. Press ed., 1997).
Gabriel J. Chin & Randy Wagner, The Tyranny of the Minority: Jim Crow and the Counter-Majoritarian
Difficulty, 43 HARV. CIV. RTS.–CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 65, 66 (2008) (noting that in 1880 African
Americans constituted a majority of the population in Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina,
and over forty percent of the population in Alabama, Florida, Georgia, and Virginia).
See Paul Finkelman, The Hidden History of Northern Civil Rights Law and the Villainous Supreme Court, 1875–
1915, 79 U. PITT. L. REV. 357, 389 (2018) (detailing that fifty-nine percent of the states outside of
the South passed anti-discrimination laws in response to the Supreme Court striking down the Civil
Rights Act of 1875).
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government had broad authority to regulate people of color, including
citizens of color, prevailed until the Civil Rights era. Certain basic
techniques of discrimination were deployed against all non-white groups
which were not generally applied to whites.
Citizenship. Under Dred Scott and other legal rules, people of color were
denied the right to become U.S. citizens, before and after the Civil War.107
Even after Reconstruction, Congress could expatriate birthright U.S.
citizens—resulting in their exclusion from the United States and potentially
rendering them stateless—for race-based reasons, such as marriage to a
noncitizen of a disfavored race.108 More fundamentally, even if citizens,
people of color were potentially subject to a range of racial discriminations.
Testimonial Disqualification. Testimonial disqualification, the legal question
at issue in Dow, was an important form of discrimination. In various
jurisdictions, Indians, African Americans, and Asians were prohibited from
testifying against whites.109 In the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Congress
107

108

109

Even after the Fourteenth Amendment, Indians born in the United States in “tribal relations” were
held not to be citizens. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 96–99 (1884); see id. at 109 (finding that the
plaintiff was not a citizen of the United States because he was an Indian born in the United States).
The Naturalization Act of 1790, in effect as amended until 1952, restricted naturalization to “free
white person[s].” Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103, 103 (in effect as amended until
1952); see also Ah Hee v. Crippen, 19 Cal. 491, 497 (1861) (Field, C.J.) (“The plaintiff is a Chinaman,
and, of course, is not a citizen of the United States, or entitled to become such under any existing
legislation of Congress . . . .”). While persons of African nativity and descent were allowed to
naturalize in 1870, one judge explained—in an opinion denying an Indian the right to naturalize—
that this provision was merely symbolic: `
[T]here is this to be said in excuse for this seeming inconsistency: the negroes of Africa
were not likely to emigrate to this country, and therefore the provision concerning them
was merely a harmless piece of legislative buncombe, while the Indian and Chinaman were
in our midst, and at our doors and only too willing to assume the mantle of American
sovereignty, which we ostentatiously offered to the African, but denied to them.
In re Camille, 6 F. 256, 257–58 (C.C.D. Or. 1880) (discussing 16 Stat. 256; § 2169 Rev. St.).
However, after much consideration, one judge found that a Mexican applicant was entitled to
naturalize, but this was clearly a decision based on legislative intent rather than a constitutional
right. In re Rodriguez, 81 F. 337, 354–55 (W.D. Tex. 1897) (“[W]hatever may be the status of the
applicant viewed solely from the standpoint of the ethnologist, he is embraced within the spirit and
intent of our laws upon naturalization, and his application should be granted . . . .”).
See Inaba v. Nagle, 36 F.2d 481, 481–82 (9th Cir. 1929) (affirming the loss of citizenship after a
“native-born citizen of the United States” married an “alien ineligible to citizenship.”); Ex parte (Ng)
Fung Sing, 6 F.2d 670, 670 (W.D. Wash. 1925) (“Racially the petitioner is a Chinese (yellow race);
politically she was born a member of the citizenry of the United States. Citizenship is a political
status, and may be defined and the privilege limited by the Congress. The Congress has, no doubt,
power to say what act shall expatriate a citizen and forfeit right to ‘protection abroad,’ and prescribe
prerequisites for resumption of citizenship. Petitioner has no vested right in the act, supra.”).
E.g., Gabriel J. Chin, “A Chinaman’s Chance” in Court: Asian Pacific Americans and Racial Rules of Evidence,
3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 965 (2013) (discussing how the laws of evidence discriminated against Asian
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legislatively invalidated these laws by providing that all persons an equal right
“give evidence.”110 But after Congress prohibited Chinese from testifying in
certain Chinese Exclusion cases, in 1893 the Supreme Court upheld the
testimonial disqualification on a broad ground: “The competency of all
witnesses, without regard to their color, to testify in the courts of the United
States, rests on acts of congress, which Congress may at its discretion modify
or repeal.”111 Thus, the specific holding of Dow remained good law, as a
constitutional matter. There was no inherent right of people of color, even
if citizens, to testify.
Testimonial incapacity made people vulnerable to rape, robbery,
murder, and other crimes without recourse. It also justified other
discrimination. For example, under an 1802 statute, Congress restricted the
right to carry mail to “free persons”; in 1862 they considered removing the
limitation.112 Opponents objected that race neutrality would extend
employment
not only to blacks, but also to the Indian tribes, civilized and uncivilized, and
to the Chinese, who have come in such large numbers to the Pacific coast.
These last are not recognized there as entitled to the rights and privileges of
free persons; but the effect of this bill would be, as I say, to make officers of
Government, as mail carriers, of all these classes of persons who obtain
contracts of the Department.113

In addition to the problem posed by the objectionable principle of racial
equality, eliminating the restriction could have created a practical difficulty:
“[I]n some of the States Indians and negroes, and in California and Oregon
the Chinese also, are not allowed by the statutes of the State to give testimony

110
111
112

113

Americans, including treating Asian testimony as less credible or making it incompetent entirely);
Thomas D. Morris, Slaves and the Rules of Evidence in Criminal Trials, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1209
(1993) (describing how slaves could not testify against whites, but could testify against free Blacks
and Indians); BYRON K. ELLIOTT & WILLIAM F. ELLIOTT, 2 TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE, INSTRUMENTS OF EVIDENCE § 716, at 22–24 (1904) (explaining the historical
application of the laws of evidence to Blacks, Indians, and Asians). See also Dupree v. State, 33 Ala.
380, 387 (1859) (“Negroes, mulattoes, Indians, and all persons of mixed blood descended from
negro or Indian ancestors, to the third generation inclusive, though one ancestor of each generation
may have been a white person, whether bond or free, must not be witnesses in any cause, civil or
criminal, except for or against each other.”) (emphasis omitted) (quoting ALA. CODE § 2276 (1852));
People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399, 399, 404 (1854) (holding that a statute providing “no Indian or Negro
shall be allowed to testify as a witness in any action or proceeding in which a white person is a
party” also excluded Chinese testimony).
42 U.S.C. § 1981.
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 729 (1893).
Act of May 3, 1802, ch. 48, § 4, 2 Stat. 189, 191, amended by Act of Apr. 30, 1810, ch. 37, § 4, 2 Stat.
592, 594, amended by Act of Mar. 3, 1825, ch. 64, § 7, 4 Stat. 102, 104; CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong.,
2d Sess. 2231 (1862).
CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 2231 (1862).
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in the courts against persons . . . . [W]hen you repeal the law of 1825, and
allow persons to be mail contractors who are not legal witnesses, they could
not testify against a thief who robbed the mails before their eyes; and you
thus impair the security of our mail-bags and their contents.”114 This
argument sufficed to kill the proposal.
Racial Disenfranchisement. States also had no obligation to allow citizens to
vote.115
Before Reconstruction, explicit racial discrimination was
116
common.
After 1870, the Fifteenth Amendment prohibited racial
discrimination against citizens with respect to the right to vote. But Congress
consciously decided to allow discrimination against Chinese and other nonwhites; in an era when many states allowed non-citizens to vote, under the
Fifteenth Amendment particular races of non-citizens could be enfranchised
or not.117 States sometimes successfully disenfranchised Indians on various

114
115
116

117

Id. at 2232.
In Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1874), the Court famously held that native-born women, though
citizens, could be denied the right to vote.
Thus, the California Constitution in effect in 1864 enfranchised:
Every white male citizen of the United States, and every white male citizen of Mexico who
shall have elected to become a citizen of the United States under the treaty of peace
exchanged and ratified at Queretaro on the 30th day of May, 1848, of the age of twentyone years, who shall have been a resident of the State six months next preceding the
election, . . . provided, that nothing herein contained shall be construed to prevent the
Legislature, by a two-thirds concurrent vote, from admitting to the right of suffrage Indians
or the descendants of Indians, in such special cases as such a proportion of the legislative
body shall deem just and proper.
Bourland v. Hildreth, 26 Cal. 161, 178 (1864) (quoting Cal. Const., art. II, § 1). United States v.
Lucero, 1869–NMSC–003, ¶ 21, 1 N.M. 422, 439 (“On the sixteenth of February, 1854, the
legislative assembly of New Mexico passed the following act, section 70: ‘That the pueblo Indians
of this territory for the present, and until they shall be declared by the congress of the United States
to have the right, are excluded from the privilege of voting at the popular elections of the territory,
except in the elections for overseers of ditches to which they belong, and in the elections proper to
their own pueblos to elect their officers according to their ancient customs.’”).
See Earl M. Maltz, The Federal Government and the Problem of Chinese Rights in the Era of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL. 223, 231 (1994) (explaining that the Fifteenth Amendment
left to the states extention of viting rights to non-Black, non-white non-citizens.); John Hayakawa
Torok, Reconstruction and Racial Nativism: Chinese Immigrants and the Debates on the Thirteenth, Fourteenth,
and Fifteenth Amendments and Civil Rights Laws, 3 ASIAN L.J. 55, 82–83 (1996) (describing the opposition
to extend suffrage to Chinese immigrants).
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pretexts.118 Mexican Americans were disenfranchised by the Texas white
primary, among other laws.119
In addition, the Supreme Court approved disenfranchisement of African
Americans under authority of a legal principle which would have systematic
application beyond voting and beyond African Americans. At the turn of
the twentieth century, the Supreme Court held that states were free to enact
laws with the intent to disenfranchise non-whites, or disadvantage them in
any other way, so long as the laws were facially neutral, and challengers could
not prove they were discriminatorily applied.
A leading U.S. Supreme Court case involved the Mississippi Constitution
of 1890, which, the Mississippi Supreme Court explained, had been drafted
by a convention which
swept the circle of expedients to obstruct the exercise of the franchise by the
negro race. By reason of its previous condition of servitude and dependence,
this race had acquired or accentuated certain peculiarities of habit, of
temperament, and of character, which clearly distinguished it, as a race,
from that of the whites—a patient, docile people, but careless, landless, and
migratory within narrow limits, without forethought, and its criminal
members given rather to furtive offenses than to the robust crimes of the
whites. Restrained by the federal constitution from discriminating against
the negro race, the convention discriminated against its characteristics and
the offenses to which its weaker members were prone.120

Jurors had to be voters in Mississippi, so all-white civil and criminal juries
were a consequence of electoral disenfranchisement.

118

119

120

Willard Hughes Rollings, Citizenship and Suffrage: The Native American Struggle for Civil Rights in the
American West, 1830–1965, 5 NEV. L.J. 126, 135 (2004) (“From 1924 to 1956 many western states
would deny Indians the right to vote. Despite the changes brought about by the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments, the Constitution still granted the states great autonomy with regards to
suffrage, and until the Voting Rights Act of 1965, states had almost unlimited power to make rules
for franchise. The states used this unlimited power to exclude Indian citizens from voting. Using
poll taxes, literacy tests, English language tests, and refusing to place polling places in or near Indian
communities, western states were successful in their efforts to prevent Indians from voting.”); see,
e.g., In re Liquor Election in Beltrami Cty., 163 N.W. 988, 989 (Minn. 1917) (“That these 52 mixed
and full blood Indians were not citizens, and as such entitled to vote, because they were born within
the territorial limits of Minnesota, must be considered settled.”) (citing, inter alia, Scott v. Sandford,
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857); Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884)).
See Orville Vernon Burton, Tempering Society’s Looking Glass: Correcting Misconceptions About the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 and Securing American Democracy, 76 LA. L. REV. 1, 12 (2015) (discussing how
Mexican American voters were eliminated from the Texas primary in 1914); see also Michael C.
Campbell, Politics, Prisons, and Law Enforcement: An Examination of the Emergence of “Law and Order” Politics
in Texas, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631, 638 (2011) (noting that the Texas redemption constitutional
convention “explicitly targeted the political disenfranchisement of Blacks, Mexicans, and Native
Americans”).
Ratliff v. Beale, 74 Miss. 247, 266 (1896).
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The Mississippi Supreme Court’s candor regarding the state’s intent to
discriminate is startling to the modern ear, but the Court was right to be
confident that its frankness would be legally unproblematic. Mississippian
Henry Williams was sentenced to death after being charged by an all-white
grand jury and convicted by an all-white petit jury. On review, the U.S.
Supreme Court unanimously held that the motives of the Mississippi
constitutional convention in structuring its laws to deny African Americans
the right to vote were entirely irrelevant. After quoting the language of
Mississippi Supreme Court above, the U.S. Supreme Court explained:
nothing tangible can be deduced from this. If weakness were to be taken
advantage of, it was to be done ‘within the field of permissible action under
the limitations imposed by the Federal Constitution,’ and the means of it
were the alleged characteristics of the negro race, not the administration of
the law by officers of the State.121

Laws enacted with a discriminatory motivation could be invalidated in a
particular case based on proof of discriminatory enforcement. But after Yick
Wo v. Hopkins122 warned of this possibility, discriminators had every reason to
be discreet. For example, in 1970, after legal doctrine had changed,
California invalidated its literacy test for voting, noting that one of the
reasons is that it had been enacted to prevent U.S.-born Chinese from
voting.123 But no successful challenge had been brought to the law in the
decades it had been in effect.
Miscegenation Laws. People of color were prohibited from marrying white
persons, a policy which not only reinforced racist principles124 but also

121

122
123

124

Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213, 222 (1898), aff’g 20 So. 1023, 1023 (Miss. 1896) (citing Ratliff
v. Beale, 74 Miss. 247, 266 (1896)). For discussions of the history of judicial review of legislative
motive, see Katie R. Eyer, Ideological Drift and the Forgotten History of Intent, 51 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L.
REV. 1 (2016); Caleb Nelson, Judicial Review of Legislative Purpose, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1784 (2008).
Under more recent doctrine, a law enacted with a discriminatory motive and continuing to have a
discriminatory effect is unconstitutional. See e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985)
(holding that section 182 of the Alabama Constitution of 1901 is unconstitutional, because it was
originally enacted with a racially discriminatory purpose and continued to have a discriminatory
effect).
118 U.S. 356 (1886).
Castro v. California, 466 P.2d 244, 248 n.11 (Cal. 1970) (“The Constitution adopted in 1879
excluded ‘natives of China’ from voting. In 1891 the children of those thus excluded were nearing
voting age and, since the Chinese tended to retain their language and customs, partly as a response
to intense discrimination, the proposed literacy test would serve to prevent them from voting as
well.”).
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879) (“The very fact that colored people are singled
out and expressly denied by a statute all right to participate in the administration of the law, as
jurors, because of their color, though they are citizens, and may be in other respects fully qualified,
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profited the state through escheat, as spouses and out-of-wedlock children
were deemed legal strangers and denied inheritance.125 An Oregon statute,
upheld by its supreme court, made it a crime for “any white person male, or
female, to intermarry with any Negro, Chinese, or any person having one–
fourth or more negro, Chinese, or Kanaka blood, or any person having more
than one–half Indian blood.”126 Arizona law provided that “[t]he marriage
of persons of Caucasian blood, or their descendants, with Negroes, Hindus,
Mongolians, members of the Malay race, or Indians, and their descendants,
shall be null and void.”127 Mexicans were not specified in formal antimiscegenation legislation,128 although “whatever the law, registrars often

125

126
127

128

is practically a brand upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of their inferiority, and a stimulant
to that race prejudice which is an impediment to securing to individuals of the race that equal justice
which the law aims to secure to all others.”), abrogated in part on other grounds by Taylor v. Louisiana,
419 U.S. 522 (1975); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 220 (1923) (“But it is not to be supposed
that [Acts of Congress] defining eligibility [for naturalization] are arbitrary or unsupported by
reasonable considerations of public policy. The State properly may assume that the considerations
upon which Congress made such classification are substantial and reasonable. Generally speaking,
the natives of European countries are eligible. Japanese, Chinese and Malays are not.”); Brunson
v. Bd. Of Trs. of Sch. Dist. No. 1 of Clarendon Cty., 429 F.2d 820, 825 (4th Cir. 1970) (“Certainly
Brown had to do with the equalization of educational opportunity; but it stands for much more.
Brown articulated the truth that Plessy chose to disregard: that relegation of blacks to separate
facilities represents a declaration by the state that they are inferior and not to be associated with.
By condemning the practice as ‘inherently unequal,’ the Court, at long last, expunged the
constitutional principle of black inferiority and white supremacy introduced by Dred Scott, and
ordered the dismantling of the ‘impassible barrier’ upheld by that case.”).
In re Shun T. Takahashi’s Estate, 129 P.2d 217, 219 (Mont. 1942) (“Marriage between a Japanese
and a white person is prohibited in this state.”); In re Walker’s Estate, 46 P. 67, 68 (Ariz. 1896)
(Indian spouse and child could not inherit; “[i]t is readily seen that this pretended marriage, if it
had been a marriage in fact, was illegal and void, and imposed no obligation on either party
thereto.”); In re Morgan’s Estate, 265 P. 241, 244 (Cal. 1928) (“The evidence shows that the father
was a white person and that the two women, whom we are asked to presume that he married, were
mulattoes. It has been the law of this state from its earliest days, and long before either Annie
Morgan or Susan O. Casey was born, that a marriage between a white person and a mulatto was
illegal. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, we must presume that the laws of the state
of Mississippi and Louisiana are and were the same. With an express statutory inhibition against a
marriage between persons of these two races, no presumption can be indulged in that this law was
violated and a marriage entered into between these parties.”).
In re Paquet’s Estate, 200 P. 911, 913 (Or. 1921).
State v. Pass, 121 P.2d 882, 882 (Ariz. 1942). See Kevin Noble Maillard, The Pocahontas Exception:
The Exemption of American Indian Ancestry from Racial Purity Law, 12 MICH. J. RACE & L. 351, 352 (2007)
(describing the Virginia’s Racial Integrity Act, which prohibited interracial marriage); Karen M.
Woods, A “Wicked and Mischievous Connection”: The Origins of Indian-White Miscegenation Law, 23 LEGAL
STUD. F. 37 (1999).
Dean Moran reports that:
By treaty, former Mexican citizens enjoyed the full privileges of American citizenship, so
anti-miscegenation laws never formally prohibited mixed marriages with Anglos. Yet, the
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informally denied marriage licenses to Mexicans who looked too dark to
marry a white person.”129
Segregation. Citizens of color could be subject to segregation in schools and
other places.130 After passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Nevada
Supreme Court upheld a statute providing that “Negroes, Mongolians and
Indians shall not be admitted into the public schools, but the board of trustees
may establish a separate school for their education, and use the public school
funds for the support of the same.”131 While segregation of African American
students was the most systematic, Indian,132 Mexican,133 and Asian134 pupils
were also excluded from white schools.

129
130

131
132

133

134

subordinated status of Mexicans in their new home country led to a steep drop in the
number of intermarriages.
Rachel F. Moran, Love with A Proper Stranger: What Anti-Miscegenation Laws Can Tell Us About the Meaning
of Race, Sex, and Marriage, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1663, 1670 (2004) [hereinafter Moran]. In
invalidating California’s anti-miscegenation statute, the California Supreme Court reported that
the law does not “set up ‘Mexicans’ as a separate category, although some authorities consider
Mexico to be populated at least in part by persons who are a mixture of ‘white’ and ‘Indian.’” Perez
v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17, 22–23 (Cal. 1948).
Moran, supra note 128128.
Smith v. State, 46 S.W. 566, 570 (Tenn. 1898) (“No good reason can be perceived why such
legislation is objectionable, or why it might not even be extended. If California or any of the states
of the West should take a like view as to intermixture of their Chinese population with that of native
or white people in public conveyances, it seems clear that for the same reasons they might enact
the same laws, and, indeed, yet others, for the separation of other races who might be hostile or
prejudiced towards each other.”).
State ex rel. Stoutmeyer v. Duffy, 7 Nev. 342, 346 (1872) (quoting Act of Mar. 8, 1867, ch. 52, sec.
50, § 21, 1867 Nev. Sess. Law 89, 95).
See Sing v. Sitka Sch. Bd., 7 Alaska 616, 624 (D. Alaska 1927) (upholding segregation of Indians,
noting that “it seems to be well settled law, by numerous decisions, that the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States does not guarantee to the colored races a community of
rights with the white race, and that it is within the power of the state to establish separate schools
for the colored race, but that such schools must be on an equal plane with those maintained for the
white race.”); see also Goins v. Bd. of Trustees of Indian Normal Training Sch. at Pembroke, 86 S.E.
629, 630 (N.C. 1915) (discussing statute providing that Croatan Indian children were to have
separate schools, school committees of their own race and color, and teachers of their own choice).
See Westminster Sch. Dist. v. Mendez, 161 F.2d 774, 781 (9th Cir. 1947) (invalidating segregation
of Mexican American students not authorized by California law). Other courts had disagreed about
whether segregation was lawful only if authorized by statute. Compare People ex rel. King v.
Gallagher, 93 N.Y. 438, 450 (1883) (upholding regulation segregating African American students,
despite lack of statutory authorization, as there was for Indian students), with Crawford v. Dist. Sch.
Bd. for Sch. Dist. No. 7, 137 P. 217, 221 (Or. 1913) (“There is no statute in this state expressly
granting authority to school boards to establish separate schools for black or red children, and to
exclude the colored children from the schools intended for white children; nor can this power be
implied from any power that has been granted to school boards.”).
California’s path was particularly tortuous. It first authorized separate schools for African
American and Indian children. See Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36, 48 (1874). In 1885, the California
Supreme Court held that there was no authority to entirely exclude Chinese children. See Tape v.
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Property Ownership. People of color were restricted in their rights to own
property. All were subject to restrictive covenants which, in 1926, seemed to
have been upheld by a unanimous Supreme Court.135 A typical covenant
provided “that no part of said premises shall ever ever be conveyed,
transferred, let or demised to any person or persons of African, Mexican,
Mongolian or Indian descent.”136 Of course, as Lone Wolf held, tribal
possession of reservations was subject to the authority of Congress to
determine that it was time for Indians to relocate, and their land made
available to others.137 Asian immigrants were subject to laws prohibiting
“aliens ineligible to citizenship” from owning land,138 and their U.S.-born
citizen children were subject to restrictions on ownership designed to prevent
ineligible noncitizens from controlling real property.139
Physical Liberty. In very different ways, the bodily liberty of members of
each of these groups was subject to arbitrary termination. In connection with
the displacement authorized by Lone Wolf, of course, many Indians were
forced to move. In a later period, Indian children were removed from their
homes and sent to boarding schools.140 If the perpetrators had been

135
136

137
138
139

140

Hurley, 6 P. 129, 130 (Cal. 1885). Nevertheless, the legislature then authorized separate schools
for white and Asian children. See Wong Him v. Callahan, 119 F. 381, 382–83 (C.C.N.D. Cal.
1902); but see Wysinger v. Crookshank, 23 P. 54, 56 (Cal. 1890) (finding that segregation of African
Americans was unauthorized under that law); . Piper v. Big Pine Sch. Dist., 226 P. 926, 928, 931–
31 (Cal. 1924) (blocking segregation for Indian and Asian children).
See Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 332 (1926) (finding lack of sufficient constitutional or
statutory basis to challenge racial covenant).
McRae v. Lois Grunow Mem’l Clinic, 14 P.2d 478, 479 (Ariz. 1932). On the other hand, where
there was no valid covenant, an owner could sell to anyone. See State Realty Co. v. Wood, 57
S.E.2d 102, 103 (Va. 1950) (“There is no limitation or restriction upon the seller to select a
purchaser from any racial, social or religious group. He is free to sell to any one—to an Eskimo,
Chinaman, Buddhist, Mohammedan or Communist.”).
See STUART BANNER, HOW THE INDIANS LOST THEIR LAND: LAW AND POWER ON THE
FRONTIER, 245 (2007).
Dudley O. McGovney, The Anti-Japanese Land Laws of California and Ten Other States, 35 CAL. L. REV.
7, 49 (1947) (quoting Frick v. Webb, 263 U.S. 326, 330 (1923)).
Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 647 (1948) (finding that California law subordinating the rights
of American citizen based on his father’s Japanese nationality was unconstitutional as applied); see
also Rose Cuison Villazor, Rediscovering Oyama v. California: At the Intersection of Property, Race, and
Citizenship, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 979, 1002 (2010) (“[T]he Supreme Court held that the State of
California’s attempted taking of Fred Oyama’s property by enforcing the Alien Land Law against
him because of his father’s ancestry constituted a form of race discrimination.”).
See DENISE K. LAJIMODIERE, STRINGING ROSARIES: THE HISTORY, THE UNFORGIVABLE, AND
THE HEALING OF NORTHERN PLAINS AMERICAN INDIAN BOARDING SCHOOL SURVIVORS
(2019) (describing interviews with sixteen American Indian boarding school survivors and the
trauma that the survivors endured); DAVID WALLACE ADAMS, EDUCATION FOR EXTINCTION:
AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE BOARDING SCHOOL EXPERIENCE, 1875–1928 (1995) (exploring
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communists or non-white, these schools might well have been called
reeducation camps.
Before the Civil War, African Americans, free and enslaved, were subject
to decades of discussion about whether it would be best for the United States
to deport them to a colony, although few, other than enslaved persons
unlawfully brought to the United States by slave traders, were forcibly
removed.141 Free people of color, north and south, were susceptible to
kidnapping and sale into slavery.142 While the United States abandoned the
colonization project, afterwards, particularly in the former Confederate
states, African Americans were subject to a criminal justice system corrupted
to force them into involuntary servitude.143 Although vague laws like

141

142

143

how American Indian children were removed to boarding schools to be “reformed into fully
civilized members of the human race”); Andrea A. Curcio, Civil Claims for Uncivilized Acts: Filing Suit
Against the Government for American Indian Boarding School Abuses, 4 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J.
45 (2006) (discussing how American-Indian children were forcibly removed to boarding schools
and, as a result, suffered severe physical and emotional harm).
See NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE STUDY OF AFRICAN AMERICAN RECOLONIZATION (Beverly C.
Tomek & Matthew J. Hetrick eds., 2017) (analyzing the notion of separating the races by removing
Black Americans to Africa); P.J. STAUDENRAUS, THE AFRICAN COLONIZATION MOVEMENT
1816–1865 (1961) (reviewing how the African colonization movement took hold in the United
States).
See JONATHAN DANIEL WELLS, THE KIDNAPPING CLUB: WALL STREET, SLAVERY, AND
RESISTANCE ON THE EVE OF THE CIVIL WAR (2020) (describing New York City as proslavery
based on its enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act, resulting in kidnapping of free Blacks within the
city).
See Stratacos v. State, 748 S.E.2d 828, 833 n.6 (Ga. 2013) (“Georgia’s labor contract act was just
one of many Jim Crow statutory schemes that used criminal sanctions, or the threat of criminal
sanctions, to coerce African–Americans into providing labor.”) (citing DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON,
SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL
WAR TO WORLD WAR II (2008))); see also Jackson v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 124 P.2d 240, 241
(Colo. 1942) (affirming conviction of a Black and white unmarried couple for cohabiting because
their actions violated an ordinance providing that “[a] vagrant within the meaning and provisions
of this article shall be deemed to be * * * any person who shall lead an * * * immoral * * * course of
life”).
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vagrancy statutes were most often turned against African Americans,
Indians,144 Asians,145 and members of other groups were also caught up.146
During World War II, “citizen and alien Japanese alike” were
incarcerated in camps.147 Asian immigrants were also potentially subject to
race-based deportation at the pleasure of Congress:
No limits can be put by the courts upon the power of Congress to protect,
by summary methods, the country from the advent of aliens whose race or
habits render them undesirable as citizens, or to expel such if they have
already found their way into our land and unlawfully remain therein.148

In order to carry out Asian Exclusion, Asian appearance was made probable
cause to arrest, and a sufficient ground to impose the burden of proving
lawful presence on the Asian.149 Although the weight of immigration policy
fell most harshly on Asians, immigration laws also discriminated against
African150 and some Indian151 noncitizens.
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See Chauncey Shafter Goodrich, The Legal Status of the California Indian, 14 CALIF. L. REV. 83, 93
(1926) (discussing vagrancy statute applicable solely to Indians).
See Ex parte Tom Wong, 10 P.2d 797, 798 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1932) (affirming conviction under a
statute providing that “[e]very person (except a California Indian) without visible means of living
who has the physical ability to work, and who does not seek employment, nor labor when
employment is offered him * * * is a vagrant and is punishable”); see also Territory v. Matsumoto,
16 Haw. 267, 268 (1904) (“The evidence shows that some thirty Japanese were arrested on
suspicion, being held on charges of vagrancy and other charges.”).
See generally United States v. James, 952 F.3d 429, 434 (3d Cir. 2020) (noting that vagrancy laws
“invited selective enforcement by police officers, judges, and juries, with the burden commonly
falling on disfavored racial and social groups. See Risa Goluboff, Vagrant Nation: Police Power,
Constitutional Change, and the Making of the 1960S, at 15–20, 115–27 (2016).”).
See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 91 (1943) (recommending the evacuation and
incarceration for all persons of Japanese ancestry, even U.S. citizens).
Oceanic Steam Nav. Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 336 (1909) (quoting Wong Wing v. United
States, 163 U.S. 228, 237 (1896)).
Gabriel J. Chin, “A Chinaman’s Chance” in Court: Asian Pacific Americans and Racial Rules of Evidence, 3
U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 965, 979 n.79 (2013) (discussing Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 89
(1934) (quoting Chin Bak Kan v. United States, 186 U.S. 193, 200 (1902) (“[T]he inestimable
heritage of citizenship is not to be conceded to those who seek to avail themselves of it under
pressure of a particular exigency, without being able to show that it was ever possessed.”))).
See, e.g., Bill Ong Hing, Immigration Policies: Messages of Exclusion to African Americans, 37 HOW. L.J. 237
(1994) (discussing how U.S. immigration policies send messages of exclusion to African Americans).
American Indians born in Canada have a right under the Jay Treaty—the treaty ending the
Revolutionary War—to free passage into the United States, but U.S. law imposes a blood quantum
requirement, limiting the ability of such persons to marry or adopt. See Paul Spruhan, The Canadian
Indian Free Passage Right: The Last Stronghold of Explicit Race Restriction in United States Immigration Law, 85
N.D. L. REV. 301 (2009) (discussing the history behind the free passage right and the implications
that it has on contemporaneous federal Indian law and immigration law). In addition, Mexicans
are treated differently: “[t]ransborder tribes that straddle the U.S.-Mexico border do not benefit
from the Jay Treaty or section 289 of the INA.” Leti Volpp, The Indigenous As Alien, 5 U.C. IRVINE
L. REV. 289, 313, n.147 (2015).
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The power of race-based removal was sometimes exercised even more
vigorously against Mexicans than it had been against the Asians for whom
the doctrine was invented.152 In the 1930s and the 1950s, in combined
federal-state operations called the “Mexican repatriation” and “Operation
Wetback,” “citizen and alien Mexicans alike” were sent to Mexico to reduce
their economic competition with domestic workers.153 More recently, the
Supreme Court held that, in immigration enforcement, “the likelihood that
any given person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough to make
Mexican appearance a relevant factor” in making a forcible stop to
investigate their status.154 Even today, U.S. citizens—mostly, apparently,
non-white—are regularly detained as noncitizens, and sometimes deported,
through casual administrative procedures.155
152

153

154

155

A U.S. District Court recently found that the main immigration crimes in U.S. law were enacted
with an anti-Mexican animus. See United States v. Carrillo-Lopez, No. 3:20-cr-00026-MMDWGC, 2021 WL 3667330, at *5 (D. Nev. Aug. 18, 2021) (“[T]he evidence Carrillo-Lopez provides
demonstrating the animus which tainted the Act of 1929, along with other proffered evidence
contemporaneous with the INA’s enactment in 1952, is sufficient for Carrillo-Lopez to meet his
burden that discriminatory intent was a motivating factor of both the 1929 and 1952 enactments.”).
See also Eric S. Fish, Race, History, and Immigration Crimes, 107 IOWA L. REV. 1051 (2022),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3827488 (noting how the Undesirable Aliens Act of 1929 was
motivated by pseudoscientific racism and preventing Latin American immigrants from
permanently settling in the United States).
See Kevin R. Johnson, Trump’s Latinx Repatriation, 66 UCLA L. REV. 1444 (2019) (exploring the
historical episodes of Mexican mass deportation and likening President Trump’s immigration
agenda to another concerted effort to remove Latinx people from the United States); Kevin R.
Johnson, The Forgotten “Repatriation” of Persons of Mexican Ancestry and Lessons for the “War on Terror”, 26
PACE L. REV. 1 (2005) (arguing that the United States should acknowledge the repatriation
campaign of the 1930s and its enduring impact on Mexican-Americans).
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886–87 (1975). It is not difficult to combine ethnic
appearance along with other factors such as language, dress, and location, to corroborate the
“evidence” that a non-white person could well be an unauthorized migrant. See, e.g., Lee v. Immigr.
& Naturalization Serv., 590 F.2d 497, 502 (3d Cir. 1979) (citing Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 881)
(“[T]he men’s conversation in Chinese, their mode of dress and their proximity to the China Inn,
a known employer of illegal aliens in the past, aroused an initial suspicion in Hughes’ mind that the
two men might be illegal aliens employed at that restaurant.”).
See Rachel E. Rosenbloom, The Citizenship Line: Rethinking Immigration Exceptionalism, 54 B.C. L. REV.
1965, 2017 (2013) (“Yet race remains profoundly present in the adjudication of contemporary
citizenship claims. The vast majority of recent cases that have come to light regarding deportations
of citizens have involved individuals deported to Latin America and the Caribbean, and in
particular to Mexico.”); Jacqueline Stevens, U.S. Government Unlawfully Detaining and Deporting U.S.
Citizens As Aliens, 18 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 606, 682 (2011) (noting “the presumption of U.S.
citizenship on the part of those born abroad to U.S.-born parents who seem White, and the
presumption of foreign citizenship for similarly situated children of U.S. parents who are racialized
as non-White”); ACLU FLA., CITIZENS ON HOLD: A LOOK AT ICE’S FLAWED DETAINER SYSTEM
IN
MIAMI-DADE COUNTY (Mar. 20, 2019), https://www.aclufl.org/sites/default
/files/field_documents/aclufl_report_-_citizens_on_hold_-_a_look_at_ices_flawed_detainer_
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Citizens of Color and the Master Race. Undoubtedly, the Civil Rights
Revolution of the 1960s substantially changed the status and day-to-day lives
of millions of people of color in the United States. But during the Jim Crow
era, states and the federal government had broad power to regulate the rights
and status of people of color in ways which would have been inconceivable
with respect to whites as a class. The point is illustrated by two of the most
important federal statutes protecting civil rights, the Civil Rights Act of
1866,156 and the Enforcement Act of 1870,157 which operated by granting a
set of enumerated rights to the protected classes to the same extent “as is
enjoyed by white citizens.”158 For all people to have “equal rights” and for
people of color to enjoy the same rights as “white citizens” were the same
thing.
To be sure, throughout American history, individual white persons and
families also suffered accident, misfortune, and unfair treatment at the hands
of the government and others. Yet, one searches in vain for examples of
systematic denial of citizenship, deportation, deprivation of property,
disenfranchisement, or other degradation of white people, based on race
alone, because they were white people. As Chief Justice Taney wrote, from
the earliest colonial precursors of the United States until modern times, white
people as a race held the sovereignty in government, and they had the power
to share the blessings of liberty with people of color, or not, partially or
completely. No race or group ever held any similar power over white people.
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157
158

system_in_miami-dade_county.pdf [https://perma.cc/SA6V-YVGT] (discussing recent patterns
of ICE detainers in Miami-Dade County, including 420 detainer requests for people listed as U.S.
citizens, of which 83 were eventually cancelled); David J. Bier, U.S. Citizens Targeted by ICE, in
IMMIGR.
RSCH.
&
POL’Y
BRIEF
N O.
8
(Cato
Inst.,
2018),
https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/irpb-8.pdf [https://perma.cc/X6ML -JB6J]
(describing ICE practices in Travis County, Texas). For reports from the Northwestern
Deportation Research Clinic, see NW. BUFFET INST. FOR GLOBAL AFF. DEPORTATION RSCH.
CLINIC,
U.S.
Citizens
Detained
and
Departed,
https://deportation-research.buffett.
northwestern.edu/us-citizens/index.html [https://perma.cc/XHQ8-PZB5].
Act of Apr. 9, 1866, Pub. L. No. 39-31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (1866).
Act of May 31, 1870, Pub. L. No. 41-114, § 16, 16 Stat. 140, 144 (1870).
42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (“All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence,
and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property
as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes,
licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.”); 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (“All citizens of the
United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed
by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property.”). See also Nancy Leong, Enjoyed by White Citizens, 109 GEO. L.J. 1421 (2021) (arguing that
section 1981 and section 1982 are unique because they explicitly grant rights regarding contracts
and property to the same extent as white people).
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CONCLUSION
By 1964, Chief Justice Taney’s vision of the political structure of the
United States and the places of the races in it was in the process of
destruction. Nevertheless, he had proved to be prescient; the states did have
the right to determine the status of their residents, and people of color could
be put at the bottom. Taney’s vision was reflected in 1964 by a Mississippi
Supreme Court decision unanimously upholding the convictions of a group
of Freedom Riders who attacked by mob.159 The court at least implicitly
recognized the right of the police to order people of color out of public
accommodations, rather ordering out white mobs or stopping them from
rioting. In their decision, the court offered a revealing description of the
history of the relationships between the races:
This Court, like everyone else, is somewhat conversant with historical facts.
Hence it knows that slavery, as a legal institution, existed in this country from
the earliest Colonial days. That status continued unabated even after the
Declaration of Independence was proclaimed to the world in 1776 and
thereafter beyond the adoption of the Constitution itself.160

The court explained that the Civil War and Reconstruction had no effect:
Even after the newly freed slaves were enfranchised, there was little
difference thereafter in the racial attitudes insofar as social intercourse and
acceptance were concerned. . . . Even the Great Crusader for Freedom and
the Emancipator of the Slaves recognized that these differences placed a
severe limitation on the full measure of freedom for them.161

But for some reason, northern courts and civil rights protesters complained:
“The cry by certain groups for conformity to their beliefs rings out endlessly
over the land through the various media of communications.”162 However,
agitators would have to face reality:
Large numbers of people, in this broad land, are steeped in their customs,
practices, mores and traditions. In many instances, their beliefs go as deep
or deeper than religion itself. . . . From the lessons of history, it has been
learned that “though the mills of the gods grind slowly, yet they grind
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Knight v. State, 161 So. 2d 521 (Miss. 1964), cert. granted, judgment rev’d sub nom.; Thomas v.
Mississippi, 380 U.S. 524 (1965). While Knight was reversed, that fact was not recognized by
Westlaw until decades later, and Knight was treated as valid authority; for example, in Hunter v. State,
489 So. 2d 1086, 1088 (Miss. 1986), the court cited Knight with approval in an opinion authored by
Justice Roy Noble Lee, son of Knight author Chief Justice Percy Mercer Lee.
161 So. 2d at 522–23.
Id. at 523.
Id.
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exceeding small” and that human nature makes little change from day to
day, month to month, year to year, and century to century.163

The faith of Dred Scott and Lorenzo Dow had proved to be irrelevant,
and a century later, an elected court—presumably familiar with the political
views of the voters of Mississippi—candidly admitted that racial
considerations were more important than religion, and to challenge that was
to war with human nature itself.
Chief Justice Taney’s jurisprudence, and his vision for America, left much
to be desired from a modern perspective. Yet, as an historian, and as legal
realist describing the law as it actually was, his work is entitled to attention.
As a descriptive matter, Dow, Strader, and Dred Scott articulated the law of the
United States not only before, but for at least a century after the Civil War.
Taney’s work makes clear that like African Americans, Asian, Native
Americans and other non-whites had no rights the law was bound to respect.
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